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Means: The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts

THE POWER TO REGULATE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE IN FLORIDA COURTS
ERNEST MEANS"

Although there are many opportunities for conflict between the legislative
and judicial branches of Florida government, they seldom result in anything
like a continuing confrontation. Normal review procedures afford the courts
ample means to defend themselves against legislative encroachment upon the
judicial domain.' Encroachments upon the legislative domain by the lower
levels of the judiciary have normally been reversed in the course of the same
process of review, often in a decision relating to the judicial handling of the
2
legislative product.
There is, however, another form of judicial lawmaking that does possess
considerable potential for causing confrontation between the legislative and
judicial branches, and it provides the principal focus of the present paper.
This is the rulemaking authority of the Florida supreme court. Rules of the
court differ from statutes passed by the legislature primarily in the procedures
by which they are created. Both are written rules having prospective applicability. Both have the force of law. When it comes to judicial rulemaking, the
formal difference between judicial and legislative lawmaking has largely disappeared. 8
The Florida Constitution presently provides: "The supreme court shall
adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts.... These rules may be
repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each
house of the legislature." 4 Shortly after the adoption of this constitutional provision, the Florida supreme court held, in effect, that its authority thereunder
was exclusive and that the legislature had "no constitutional authority to enact
any law relating to practice and procedure.",, Here, indeed, was a potential
confrontation between the legislative and judicial branches of Florida state
government worth studying.
This article will urge abandonment of the notion that the Florida supreme
court's rulemaking authority is exclusive. It will be argued that the notion of
exclusivity is supported by neither the language of the present article V6 nor
the apparent intent of those who proposed that language, as revealed by the
*Research Associate, Florida State University College of Law. B.A. 1948, Wittenberg University; M.S. 1951, University of Wisconsin; Ph.D. 1958, University of Wisconsin; LL.B. 1964,
University of Florida.
1. See, e.g., Hamel v. Danko, 82 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1955); Trustees Internal Imp. Fund v.

Bailey, 10 Fla. 238 (1863).
2. See, e.g., Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977); Harris v. King, 137 Fla. 190, 188
So. 122 (1939).
3. See Green, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe
Rules of Evidence, 26 A.B.AJ. 482, 485 (1940).
4. FLA. CONST. art. V, §2(a).
5. In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Prac. & Proc. (FLA. CONsT. art. V, §2(a)), 281
So. 2d 204, 204 (Fla. 1973) [hereinafter cited as In re Clarification].

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 3

1980]

REGULATING FLORIDA COURTS

history of its adoption7 It will also be contended that the notion should be
abandoned because of its undesirable consequences, which are mainly two: (1)
it operates to exclude the legislature from its proper role in determining issues
of public policy that happen to be involved with court procedures," and (2) it
is a source of confusion concerning the legitimacy of many statutes that relate
in some way to court procedures, including portions of the new Florida Evidence Code.9
By its nature, the argument proceeding on grounds of constitutional construction will be quite specific. On the other hand, the criticism directed at the
consequences of the supreme court's order that its rulemaking authority is exclusive will be relatively abstract, although examples will be cited. After all,
confusion is inevitable when mutually exclusive areas of lawmaking authority
are separated by an imprecise verbal boundary line.o Similarly, the exclusion
of the legislature from issues of public policy is inevitable if the incidence of
such issues is unrelated to that boundary line.'1
Although restoration of legislative supremacy will be strongly urged, there
is no intent to advocate that the legislature take over, or even dominate in any
degree, the regulation of practice and procedure in the courts. The writer fully
acquiesces in the substantially unanimous conclusion of those who have studied
the matter that the court is better qualified to deal with problems of court
procedure than is the legislature.2 It should be possible, however, to take full
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See text accompanying notes 111-124
See text accompanying notes 125-167
See text accompanying notes 227-262
See text accompanying notes 167-226
See text preceding note 168 infra.

infra.
infra.
infra.
infra.

11. See text accompanying notes 228-232 infra.
12.

J. PARNEss

& C. KoaBAKm, A

STUDY OF THE PROCEDURAL RULE-MAKING

POWER IN THE

19-21 (1973); Green, supra note 3,at 486-87; Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice
and Procedure: a Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. Rxv. 623, 642-44 (1957); Levin
& Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 9-14 (1958); Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12
A.B.A.J. 599, 602-03 (1926); Trumbull, Judicial Responsibility for Regulating Practice and
Procedure in Illinois, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 443, 453 (1952); Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for
Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv. 276, 278-79 (1928). Roscoe
Pound and Dean Wigmore were among those who earlier argued the advantages of judicial
rulemaking as opposed to legislative. Levin and Amsterdam provided the following "briefest
survey" of their arguments: "[L]egislatures have neither the immediate familiarity with the
day-by-day practice of the courts which would allow them to isolate the pressing problems of
procedural revision nor the experience and expertness necessary to the solution of these problems; legislatures are intolerably slow to act and cause even the slightest and most obviously
necessary matter of procedural change to be long delayed; legislatures are subject to the influence of other pressures than those which seek the efficient administration of justice and
may often push through some particular and ill-advised pet project of an influential legislator
while the comprehensive, long-studied proposal of a bar association molders in committee;
and legislatures are not held responsible in the public eye for the efficient administration of
the courts and hence do not feel pressed to constant reexamintion of procedural methods.
"Moreover, it must be remembered that a very large part of maintaining maximum effectiveness in the courts does not lie in drastic wholesale procedural reform, but in the necessary minor alterations of single rules from time to time as experience dictates, and such small
matters as these inevitably fare badly when they must compete for legislative attention."
UNrIED STATES
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advantage of the supreme court's superior expertise and flexibility in initiating
rules of practice and procedure without making its rulemaking authority exclusive.13
HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUsIVE
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

The notion that the Florida supreme court's rulemaking authority is exclusive - in the sense that forecloses any legislative participation in the regulation of practice and procedure - did not emerge full-blown at the beginning of
the state's history. As in most other jurisdictions, there was an early period
marked by legislative supremacy over practice and procedure,,4 with judicial
dominance occurring much later by virtue of constitutional grants of rulemaking authority to the court.' 5 In view of the present article's focus on the
judicial role, it is appropriate to trace briefly its evolution in Florida.
Three periods have special relevance. The period prior to July 1, 1957, was
notable for the absence of any specific constitutional delegation of rulemaking
authority and was marked by legislative domination over the regulation of
practice and procedure in the courts. The middle period was introduced by a
1956 amendment to the Florida Constitution providing that "[t]he practice
and procedure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme
court.' ' 1 6 Finally, the third period began with the adoption of the present

language of article V, the judicial article, which became effective January 1,
1973.17

PeriodPriorto July 1,1957
Prior to the revision of article V of the Florida Constitution which took
effect July 1, 1957, there was no express grant of constitutional authority to
regulate practice and procedure in the courts either to the supreme court or to
the legislature. In the absence of such a grant, the legislative branch dominated
the subject by virtue of the general legislative authority vested in it by all
Florida constitutions. 8 Additional support for legislative authority over practice and procedure existed in the provisions, first appearing in the Constitution
of 1868,19 prohibiting the enactment of any special or local act relating to practice and procedure in the courts (and to a number of other subject matters as
well) and requiring that this subject matter be dealt with only by general law.
If these provisions were not a source of legislative authority over court pro13. See text following note 273 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 18-34 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 35-47 infra.
16. Fla. H.J.R. 810, §3; (Reg. Sess. 1955) (adopted Nov. 6, 1956 as FLA. CONST. art. V, §3;
effective July 1, 1957).
17. Fla. S.J.R. 52-D (Spec. Sess. 1971) (adopted March 14, 1972 as FLA. CONST. art. V;
effective January 1,1973).
18. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, §1; FLA. CONSTS. of 1868, 1865, 1861, and 1838, art.
IV, §1.
19. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §§17-18 (corresponding to FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III,

§§20-21).
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cedures, they could at least be read as recognizing authority that already existed.20
Florida constitutions of the period contained other provisions that might
have provided some support for the notion of a court-based rulemaking authority - for example, dividing the power of government into executive, legislative,
and judicial branches and forbidding one branch to exercise any power properly belonging to one of the others 21 and vesting the judicial power in the
supreme court and other named courts. 22 However, the Florida supreme court
laid no strong claim to inherent power to control even its own procedures,
23
much less those of the other courts.
A much more important source of judicial rulemaking authority during the
period prior to 1957 consisted of recurrent statutory delegations to the court.
As early as 1824, long before statehood, it was provided:
The Court of Appeals shall have power and it shall be its duty to
make all necessary rules for the regulation of the practice of the said
superior courts, as well as for the said court of appeals, which said rules
so made shall be submitted to the legislative council at the session
thereof next after the making of such rules, and the rules, if approved
shall after such approval have the force,
of by the said legislative council,
24
effect and authority of laws.
The delegation was refreshed upon the attainment of statehood,25 upon secession from the Union,26 and upon adoption of the 1868 Constitution.27
The earlier statutory delegations of rulemaking authority were calculated
primarily to solicit the assistance of the court for the initiation of rules of
practice and procedure, rather than to vest anything approaching final authority. Proposed rules were not to conflict with existing statutory law, and existing
rules were subject to amendment or repeal by the legislature.28 Later statutory
delegations tended more and more to place final authority over court procedures in the supreme court.
In 1929, the legislature completely abdicated its own authority so far as
rules of the supreme court itself were concerned.2 9 Such rules were to go to
effect at the time designated by the court, and it was further provided that
"thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no force or effect."' 0 The
1943 legislature made a further attempt to remove the barrier to promulgation
of new rules posed by existing statutes. The court was directed to designate the
20. See In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, Promulgation of New Fla. Rs. of Civ. P., 145 Fla.
223, 199 So. 57 (1940) [hereinafter cited as In re Promulgation].
21. FLA. CONsrS. of 1885, 1865, 1861, and 1838, art. II; FLA. CONST.of 1868, art. HI.
22. FLA. CONSTS. of 1885, 1865, 1861, and 1838, art. V; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See In re Promulgation, supra note 20.
Act of Dec. 13, 1824, s. 12, Fla. Terr. Acts (1824), p. 165.
1845 Fla. Laws, ch. 5, §5.
1861 Fla. Laws, ch. 1096, §75.

27. 1868 Fla. Laws, ch. 1626.
28. Id.
29. 1929 Fla. Laws, ch. 13870.
30. Id.
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specific statutes which should be repealed as having been superseded by rules
of the court. Statutes so identified would stand repealed as of the end of the
next session, in the absence of express legislative disapproval. 1 Legislation
enacted during the 1945 session transformed the sections making up chapter 59
of the Florida Statutes, relating to appellate procedures, into rules of court
which "may be changed, amended, repealed, or superseded by rules adopted by
32
the supreme court of this state.."
Finally, just prior to the 1956 revision of article V which included the
initial constitutional authorization for the supreme court to promulgate rules
of practice and procedure, the legislature completed the statutory delegation of
rulemaking power. An amendment to section 25.47(1) of the Florida Statutes
provided:
(1) The supreme court shall have the power to prescribe from time
to time the rules for practice and procedure in actions at law or suits in
equity, and all statutory and extraordinary forms of action, in all courts
within the state. A rule shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. When a rule is promulgated and adopted
by the supreme court concerning practice and procedure, and 3it conflicts with the statute, the rule supersedes the statutory provision. 3
The authority of the supreme court was now as complete as it could be
made by statute. It extended to all courts, and rules automatically overrode
conflicting statutes. In view of this complete legislative submission to the
principle of judicial initiative in the control of practice and procedure, it is
difficult to understand the motive for the adoption of the constitutional delegation of the following year.34 Perhaps the rulemaking provision was casually
added to what was a general revision of the judicial article of the constitution.
Of course, the legislature had the last say through its adoption of House Joint
Resolution 810, by which the revision of article V was proposed. However, a
legislature sufficiently compliant to make the statutory delegation just described could hardly be expected to become greatly exercised at the prospect of
including a provision for judicial rulemaking authority in the constitution.
After all, the constitutional delegation apparently reached no further than had
the earlier statutory delegation.
Period1957-1972
By House Joint Resolution 810, the 1955 legislature proposed a major
revision of article V of the Florida Constitution relating to the judiciary. The
proposal was approved by the electorate at the general election of 1956, to take
effect July 1, 1957.35 Although the revision made far-reaching changes in
virtually every facet of the state's judicial system, including the establishment
31. 1943 Fla. Laws, ch. 21995.
32. Ch.22854, §4 (Ch. 59 FLA.

STAT. (1949)).
33. 1955 Fla. Laws, ch. 29737, §3 (emphasis supplied).
34. See note 16 and accompanying text, supra.
35. Fla. H.J.R. 810 (Reg. Sess. 1955) (adopted Nov. 6, 1956 as FLA. CONsT. art. V; effective

July 1, 1957).
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of the district courts of appeal, 6 the present discussion is focused on one
specific provision. A new section 3 was added to provide that "[t]he practice
and procedure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme
3 7

court."

Evidently, the very next legislature following the one that proposed the revision of article V was not of the opinion that it had been rendered powerless

to legislate concerning practice and procedure. The 1957 legislature, meeting
just prior to the effective date of the article V revision, added section 25.371 to
the Florida Statutes to provide that "[w]hen a rule is adopted by the supreme
court concerning practice and procedure, and such rule conflicts with a statute,
the rule supersedes the statutory provision."38 Such an enactment would have
been quite meaningless in the face of a grant of exclusive authority to the court.
The legislature apparently read the new constitutional grant as vesting about
the same degree of authority in the court as had been vested by the earlier
statutory delegations.
Although the new provision could certainly be read as vesting exclusive
9 The published
authority, the Florida supreme court never so applied it.,
opinions of the Florida supreme court and the district courts of appeal during
the period under review reveal not a single instance in which the 1957 con-

stitutional delegation was held to have vested exclusive rulemaking authority
in the supreme court.

0

However, there are a number of holdings that the

court's rulemaking power was paramount - i.e., that valid rules would prevail,
over statutes with which they were in conflict. The following are representative.
In the 1963 case of Jaworski v. City of Opa Locka,41 the court addressed a
question certified by the circuit court pursuant to section 59.04 of the Florida
Statutes, 4 2 which had been enacted prior to the 1956 establishment of the
district courts of appeal. Rule 4.6 of the Florida Appellate Rules, which had
been promulgated subsequent to their establishment, could be read as permitting certification of such questions to the district court of appeal when that
was the court in which subsequent review of the principal case would occur.
The court held that the rule, having been adopted pursuant to article V,
section 3, "superseded any legislative enactment governing practice and procedure to the extent that the statute and the rule may be inconsistent." 43 This,
of course, is not the language of exclusiveness; in the absence of the conflicting
rule, the statute would have been fully operable.
A pair of cases decided in 1967 and 1969, respectively, provide further compelling evidence that the Florida supreme court did not, during the period
under discussion, consider its rulemaking authority to be exclusive, in the sense
86. Id.

37. Id. §3.
38. FLA. STAT. §25.371 (1979) (originally enacted as 1957 Fla. Laws, ch. 57-254, §1).
89. See text accompanying notes 41-47 infra.
40. This conclusion is confirmed by a report of the Florida Law Revision Commission,
issued near the end of the period under discussion. FLORIDA LAW REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF
CRimNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE OF FLORIDA 62 (Tallahassee, n.d. (1970)).
41. 149 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1963).
42. FLA. STAT. §59.04 (1961).
45. 149 So. 2d at 84.
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that it foreclosed the legislature from participation in the regulation of court
procedures. In the 1967 case of Smith v. State,44 the supreme court held that a
plea of nolo contendere should not be accepted in a capital case, explaining:
"We are largely influenced in this direction by Sec. 912.01, Florida Statutes,
F.S.A., providing that in all cases 'except where a sentence of death may be
imposed trial by jury may be waived by the defendant.' 45 The court did not
express any doubt that the legislature had authority to enact the statute which
it had found so influential.
However, in November, 1967, the supreme court adopted a rule of criminal
procedure which expressed a policy contrary to that of the statute. Rule 1.260,
which was to take effect January 1, 1968, provided that "[a] defendant may, in
writing, waive a jury trial with the approval of the court and the consent of the
state." Subsequently, in the 1969 case of State v. Garcia,46 the court responded
to the question, certified by the Third District Court of Appeal, whether trial
by jury can be waived by a defendant who had pleaded not guilty to an indictment for a capital offense. The court answered in the affirmative, holding that
section 912.01, forbidding such waiver, had been superseded by the new rule.
Observing that its rulemaking authority was limited to matters of procedure,
the court continued, "[i]n some instances it is difficult to determine whether a
rule relates to a matter that is substantive or a matter that is procedural, but
this difficulty does not exist in the case sub judice. Rule 1.260, Cr.P.R. merely
prescribes the procedure and method of waiving a jury trial."47 Thus, the same
statute that "largely influenced" the court in a recently decided case was now
confidently labelled "procedural" and therefore superseded by a subsequently
promulgated rule of the court. Of course, had the court's rulemaking authority
been considered to be exclusive and the statute as obviously procedural as here
portrayed, the statute would have been held invalid from the time of enactment - and certainly at the time of the Smith decision.
Period1973 to Present
The third and final period relevant to the present discussion began on
January 1, 1973, the effective date of the most recent revision of the constitutional grant of rulemaking authority. By Senate Joint Resolution 52-D, the 1971
legislature proposed a complete revision of article V, relating to the judiciary.
The revision was approved by the electorate at the general election of 1972, to
go into effect January 1, 1973.48 In the new judicial article, the delegation of
rulemaking authority reads as follows:
(a) The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts including the time for seeking appellate review, the
administrative supervision of all courts, the transfer to the court having
44. 197 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1967).
45. Id. at 499 citing FLA. STAT. §912.01 (1967).
46. 229 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1969).
47. Id. at 238.
48. Fla. S.J.R. 52-D (Spec. Sess. 1971) (adopted Mar. 14, 1972 as
tive January 1, 1973).
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jurisdiction of any proceeding when the jurisdiction of another court
has been improvidently invoked, and a requirement that no cause shall
be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought. These rules
by two-thirds vote of the memmay be repealed by general law enacted
49
bership of each house of the legislature.
The 1973 revision altered the constitutional grant of rulemaking authority
in three major ways: (1) the wording of the basic grant of rulemaking authority was changed from "[t]he practice and procedure in all courts shall be
governed by rules adopted by the supreme court" to "[t]he supreme court shall
adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts .. ."; (2) the new pro-

vision specified several subjects to which the rulemaking authority shall extend;
and (3) the legislature was authorized to repeal rules of the court by a twothirds vote of both houses.
Shortly after the new revision became effective, a dramatic conflict of
opinion as to the meaning of the new rulemaking provision occurred between
the branch of government which had proposed the language of the revision
in the first place, and the branch of government which was to have the
final word in construing and applying it. The first legislative session following
the revision brought the enactment of the following statutes that were obviously procedural in nature. Chapter 73-2750 authorized a law enforcement
officer to issue a "notice to appear" in lieu of making a physical arrest for
certain minor crimes and violations. Chapter 73-7251 granted parties the right
to conduct the first examination of prospective witnesses on voir dire. Chapter
73-84,52 the first exercise by the legislature of its new constitutional authority
to repeal a rule of practice or procedure, repealed paragraph e of Rule 3.16 of
the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, relating to attorneys' fees on appellate review, and enacted a statutory provision relating to the same subject.
Chapter 73-11253 authorized the chief judge of each circuit to establish a depository for the circuit or a county within the circuit to receive, record, and
disburse all support, alimony, or maintenance payments.
Passage of these measures certainly reflected confidence on the part of the
1973 legislature that the recent revision of the rulemaking provision of article
V had not terminated its authority to legislate in the area of court practice and
procedure. However, the Florida supreme court wasted no time in setting out
its version of the extent of its own rulemaking power under the new constitutional grant. In a very unusual opinion issued shortly after the legislative
session which produced the statutes just described, the court staked out its claim
of exclusive authority over the regulation of practice and procedure. 54 After
quoting the new rulemaking provision of article V, the court continued, "[tlhe
Legislature has the constitutional right to repeal any rule of the Supreme Court
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

FLA. CONST. art V §2(a).

1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-27 (current version at FA. STAT. §§901.27-.32 (1979)).
1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-72.
1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-84 (current version at FLA. STAT. §59A6 (1979)).
1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-112 (current version at FA. $TAT. &61.181 (1979)).
In re Clarification, supra note 5.
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by a two-thirds vote, but it has no constitutional authority to enact any law
relating to practice and procedure."55
Each of the acts just described was held to be procedural and therefore invalid as lying outside the legislative authority. The repeal of paragraph e of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure by Chapter 73-84 was held to be within
the new constitutional authority of the legislature to repeal rules of the court.
The attempted enactment of an altered version as a statute, however, was rejected as an unconstitutional encroachment on the exclusive rulemaking authority of the supreme court. 56
Chapter 73-72 had purported to amend section 53.051, Florida Statutes, relating to voir dire examinations. The court explained that the statute had
previously been adopted as a rule of the court by the order promulgating the
1967 revision of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which had provided that
"[a]ll statutes not superseded [by the rules] or in conflict [with the rules] shall
remain in effect as rules promulgated by the Supreme Court." 5 Consequently,

the court continued, the former statute was no longer subject to legislative
amendment. "[A]n attempt by the Legislature to amend a statute which has
become a part of rules of practice and procedure would be a nullity."5
Chapter 73-27, 59 purporting to authorize a law enforcement officer to issue
a notice to appear in lieu of making a physical arrest in the case of certain
minor crimes and violations, and chapter 73-112,60 creating a domestic relations depository in the circuit courts, were similarly invalidated as being beyond the constitutional competence of the legislature. At the same time, Rule
3.125 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 was promulgated, and Rule
1.611 of the Florida Rules of Civil 62 Procedure was amended, to incorporate

most of the substance of the respective invalidated statutes. There were no
dissents.
The 1973 order holding that the court's rulemaking authority was exclusive
was extraordinary in several ways. For one thing, it created new law without
acknowledging that it was doing so. 63 Although the earlier constitutional language existing during the period 1957-1973 was actually more conducive to the
construction that it vested exclusive authority in the court than was the constitutional wording before the court in this case, there was not a single prior
instance of its being so construed by either the Florida supreme court or any
district court of appeal.64 By thus failing to mention that it was making a sharp
55. Id. at 204. (Citation omitted).
56. Id. at 205.
57. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1967 Revision, 187 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1966).
58. 281 So. 2d at 205. The court did not explain just how the legislature, or anyone else,
could have known that such a blanket adoption had reached a particular statute.
59. See note 50 and accompanying text, supra.
60. See note 53 and accompanying text, supra.
61. The text of Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.125 as promulgated appears in In re Clarification, supra
note 5, at 206-07.
62. The text of amendment to Fla. R. Crim. P. 1.611 appears in In re Clarification, supra
note 5, at 209.
63. See text following notes 48-49 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 41-47 supra. A recent law review article apparently

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 3
1980]

REGULATING FLORIDA COURTS

break with the past, the court avoided having to explain the rationale upon

which its action was based. It simply quoted the constitutional language and
then stated its conclusion that "[t]he legislature has the constitutional right to
repeal any rule of the Supreme Court by a two-thirds vote, but it has no constitutional authority to enact any law relating to practice and procedure. ' 65
Again, for the court to issue a ruling of such decisive importance on the
basis of such dubious precedent was very unusual. The sole authority offered

for the specific holding that the legislature was completely excluded from the
regulation of practice and procedure was the 1972 case of State v. Smith &
Figgers. It is true that in that case the court had invalidated a statute as being
an unconstitutional encroachment on the court's exclusive rulemaking authority. However, the circumstances of that case hardly qualified it to serve as
precedent for the instant one. Indeed, the reasoning of Smith & Figgers was in
a sense the opposite of that which apparently motivated the court in In re
Clarification.In the latter case, the court apparently reasoned 7 that the legislature was excluded from the regulation of practice and procedure as a consequence of the exclusiveness of the court's own authority under section 2(a) of
article V. In Smith & Figgers, on the other hand, the judicial rulemaking
authority referred to was that granted by section 4(b)(1) of article V, which
expressly authorizes the supreme court to provide by rule for the review of
interlocutory orders in the district courts of appeal. If this authority of the
court is exclusive, it is only because the legislature has no power in any event
over the jurisdiction of the courts, except in the few instances in which it is
expressly granted by the constitution.68
Finally, quite apart from the substantive holding, the 1973 proceeding was
itself very unusual. It is hardly normal for the court to act so aggressively, in
terms of the expansion of its own lawmaking authority at the expense of the
power of a coordinate branch of government, in a proceeding instituted on its
own initiative and apparently without participation or input of any kind by
anyone outside the court itself.69 The irregularity of the 1973 proceeding was
attributes a holding that the supreme court's rulemaking authority is exclusive to In re Estate
of Armistead, 240 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1970). See Alpert & Masterson, The Judicial
Power: Is Florida Covering Its Bets?, 8 STETSON L. RaV. 265, 281 (1979). However, it is clear
that the district court was referring to exclusiveness vis-a-vis the other courts of the Florida
judicial system, not the legislature. But see State v. O'Steen, 213 So. 2d 751, 753 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1968), which did contain dictum that the supreme court's rulemaking authority was
exclusive.

65. In re Clarification, supra note 5, at 204.
66. 260 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1972).
67. Because the opinion offers absolutely no explanation of the holding of the case, its

rationale can only be guessed at.
68. For example, see the authorization of FLA. CoNsT. art. V, §3(b)(2), to provide by
general law for appeals to the supreme court from final judgments of trial courts imposing
life imprisonment or final judgments entered in bond validation proceedings.
69. An electronic search by the Lexis system of all supreme court opinions since 1955 revealed only one other instance of the words "in camera" appearing in the style of the case.
The court in that case was merely correcting a scrivener's error in an existing rule. In re
Amendment to Rule 3.125(6) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 297 So. 2d 301 (Fla.
1974).
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further emphasized by the circumstance that the court was holding several
statutes to be unconstitutional. The rule adhered to by most courts was well
expressed by Justice Hobson, writing for the Florida court in a 1942 case:
It is a well established principle that the courts will not declare an
act of the legislature unconstitutional unless its constitutionality is challenged directly by one who demonstates that he is, or assuredly will be,
affected adversely by it. Nor will they declare any provision of an act
unconstitutional at the behest of a party whose rights or duties are not
affected by it unless the provision is of such character that it renders
invalid a provision of the statute which does affect such party's rights
or duties. . . .Courts should not voluntarily pass upon constitutional
questions which are not raised by the pleadings.70
True, the court has occasionally invalidated statutes in proceedings that were
not adversary in nature. 7 1 However, there seems to be no precedent for the
court's so acting here, even though the court can perhaps be perceived as coming to the defense of its own authority.
Exclusiveness constitutes one dimension of the new rulemaking authority
staked out by the Florida supreme court in its 1973 order. The other dimension, consisting of the subject matter boundary of the court's rulemaking
authority, is also important to any assessment of the extent to which the claimed
authority of the "court has displaced the ability of the legislature to function
as required by democratic principle. This dimension of the court's new rulemaking power had already been defined in an earlier concurring opinion of
Justice Adkins, appended to an order of the court adopting new and amended
rules of criminal procedure.7 2 Moreover, it had been defined in extremely broad
terms, so that the court's rulemaking authority - and also the corresponding

It is interesting to contrast the willingness of the Florida court to rule in this manner with
the reluctance of the New Jersey supreme court, also known for its aggressiveness concerning
its own rulemaking power, to rule on this same question of exclusiveness: "It is insisted we
cannot uphold the rule for prejudgment interest without also deciding whether the rule comes
within the Winberry dictum that the Court's authority as to practice and procedure is exclusive. We see no need to meet that issue. The sole question is whether the Court may treat
the subject by a rule rather than by a judicial decision despite the substantive aspect of the
subject. The issue of exclusivity involves a touchy matter, the relations among the three
branches of government. It will be time enough to talk about exclusivity when there is an impasse and no way around it. A coordinate branch should not invite a test of strength by
proclamation. Our form of government works best when all branches avoid staking out the
boundaries which separate their powers." Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 373, 307 A.2d 571, 583
(1973).
70. Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5, 8 (Fla. 1952).
71. See, e.g., In re The Florida Bar - Code of Judicial Conduct, 281 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1973);
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 63 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1953).
72. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972). It is worth
noting that this order of the supreme court was issued subsequent to the statewide referendum
approving the revision of article V containing the new statement of rulemaking authority, but
prior to the effective date of that revision. This circumstance suggests, of course, that Justice
Adkins' concurring opinion could have been written in anticipation of the court's later claim
of exclusive rulemaking authority.
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exclusion of legislative authority - reached the maximum extent that could be
justified by the constitutional language.
The constitutional grant of rulemaking authority, in both the earlier language of article V and in the new revised version, is in terms of "practice and
procedure" in the courts. Since, for present purposes, the concepts of "practice"
and "procedure" can be considered as being synonomous, the boundary of the
court's authority is actually cast in terms of the distinction between procedure
and substance. The utter inappropriateness of such a boundary, in terms of its
inherent imprecision and of the nature of the powers being separated, will be
discussed at a later point.3 It suffices for now simply to establish that the court
has defined this boundary in a way that maximizes the extent of its authority
and, correspondingly, the displacement of legislative discretion.
In his influential concurring opinion defining this boundary between legislative authority and the court's rulemaking power, Justice Adkins made passing
reference to the "twilight zone" occupied by "[t]he entire area of substance and
procedure,"7 4 and to the prevailing practice of characterizing statutes or rules
as one or the other "according to the nature of the problem for which a characterization must be made."75 However, having made this brief bow to the
reputed difficulty of defining the distinction, he hastened to assure that he had
succeeded in overcoming these problems:
From extensive research, I have gleaned the following general tests as
to what may be encompassed by the term "practice and procedure."
Practice and procedure encompass the course, form, manner, means,
method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion. "Practice and procedure" may be described as the machinery of the judicial process as
opposed to the product thereof.
Examination of many authorities leads me to conclude that substantive law includes those rules and principles which fix and declare the
primary rights of individuals as respects their persons and their property.
As to the term "procedure," I conceive it to include the administration
of the remedies available in cases of invasion of primary rights of individuals. The term "rules of practice and procedure" includes all rules
governing the parties, their counsel and the Court throughout the progress of the case from the time of its initiation until final judgment and
its execution .... 76
73. See text accompanying notes 167-171 infra.
74. 272 So. 2d at 66.
75. Id.

76. Id. Justice Adkins' concurring opinion contains several other such broad, conclusory
statements purporting to define the boundary line between procedure and substance: "As

related to criminal law and procedure, substantive law is that which declares what acts are
crimes and prescribes the punishment therefor, while procedural law is that by which one
who violates a criminal statute is punished ....
"Practice and procedure pertains to the legal machinery by which substantive law is made
....
It has also been said that substantive law creates, defines, adopts and regulates
rights, while procedural law prescribes the method of enforcing those rights ....
"Substantive rights are those existing for their own sake and constituting the normal legal
order of society, i.e., the rights of life, liberty, property and reputation. Remedial rights arise

effective

for the purpose of protecting or enforcing substantive rights ....
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Justice Adkins' definition of the practice and procedure boundary of the
court's rulemaking authority has remained authoritative in Florida. 77 By
adopting this meaning the court carved out an extremely broad area of public
activity to be subject to its rulemaking authority.79 By characterizing its authority as exclusive, the court effectively excluded the legislature from the same
79

broad area.
Although the supreme court's sudden transition to the view that its rule-

making authority was exclusive may now seem startling, because of its corollary
that the legislature was totally excluded from the regulation of practice and

procedure, its full significance was not immediately appreciated by the district
courts of appeal. In the 1973 case of Carmel v. Carmel,80 considered prior to
publication of the supreme court's momentous order in In re Clarification,the
Third District Court of Appeal independently considered Chapter 73-84, one
of the same 1973 statutes that were before the supreme court in In re Clarification.81 Interestingly, the district court reached the same conclusion as that
shortly to be announced by the supreme court - i.e., that the legislature was
82
totally without authority to regulate practice and procedure in the courts.
8
Yet, in Reedus v. Friedman,
3 decided a half year later, the same court,

composed of the same three judges, 84 handed down a ruling that was quite inconsistent with the notion that the supreme court's authority over practice and
procedure was exclusive. Reedus involved an apparent conflict between section
29.03 of the Florida Statutes8- and Rule 1.035(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil
"We have said that 'practice' means the method of conducting litigation involving rights
and corresponding defenses ....or the manner in which the power to adjudicate or determine
is exercised .... It has also been said that 'practice' is the method of conducting litigation ...." Id. at 65-66.
77. See, e.g., Avila S. Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977);
Huntley v. State, 339 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1976); Benyard v. Wainwright, 822 So. 2d 473 (Fla.
1975); Johnson v. State, 308 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1975); Greer v. Estate of Smith, 342 So. 2d 1007
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977).
78. Actually, Justice Adkins' authoritative definition of the boundary between substance
and procedure was based on dubious precedents, especially considering that the definition
later marked the boundaries of the court's exclusive rulemaking power. Justice Adkins adduced 21 judicial precedents in support of his several conclusory statements concerning the
nature of that boundary. Of these, only two involved anything similar to a confrontation
between a statute and a rule of court. State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1969); State v.
District Court, 399 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1965). None of the cases cited stood for the proposition
that the legislative authority was excluded from the regulation of practice and procedure in
the courts as a consequence of the constitutional vesting of exclusive xulemaking authority in
the judiciary. Of course, in fairness to Justice Adkins, it must be admitted that this was not
the immediate thrust of his 1972 concurring opinion. It came to have that significance only
when combined with the later ruling in In re Clarification, supra note 5.
79. For a discussion of the public policy implications of this broad exclusive rulemaking
authority, see text accompanying notes 227-262 infra.
80. 282 So. 2d 9 (Fla. d D.C.A. 1973).
81. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
82. 282 So. 2d at 10.
83. 287 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973).
84. Both the Carmel and Reedus cases were heard before Judges Carroll, Hendry, and
Haverfield.
85. FLA.STAT. §29.03 (1971).
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Procedure. The statute, which had been in existence for many years, required
the court reporter to provide a transcript for a party at a specified price per
page. The rule, on the other hand, authorized the judges of each circuit to promulgate an order setting the fees to be charged by the court reporter. The circuit court had denied a party's petition for mandamus to require the court
reporter to perform at the statutory rate, on the ground that the circuit judges
had voted, pursuant to the rule, to set new rates, even though no formal order
had been issued. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. Although superseded by the supreme court rule, the statute remained effective as to the
petitioner-appellant, in the absence of formal, recorded order required by the
rule. The court explained,
By Section 2(a) of Article V of the Constitution, F.S.A., the power to
adopt rules for practice and procedure in all courts is vested in the Supreme Court. It is now established that where rules and construing
opinions have been promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court relating
to the practice and procedure of all courts and a statutory provision provides contrary practice or procedure, the statute must fall. School Board
of Broward County v. Surette, Fla. 1973, 281 So. 2d 481 .... 86
This explanation was, of course, entirely consistent with the notion that the
supreme court and the legislature exercise concurrent authority to regulate
court procedures, with rules prevailing over conificting statutes. It was quite inconsistent with any notion that the court's rulemaking authority is exclusive
and that the legislature is totally excluded from the regulation of practice and
procedure. The supreme court apparently acquiesced in this confused explana87
tion. It denied certiorari.

Actually, the source of the Third District Court's confusion was the supreme
court itself. As indicated by the above quotation, the primary authority relied
upon by the district court was the opinion of the supreme court in School Board
of Broward County v. Surette. s That case arose out of an action against a school
board and its insurer for the death of a child at a school bus stop. The insurer
moved for a severance pursuant to section 455.06(2) of the Florida Statutes,89
which granted an automatic waiver of sovereign immunity in actions against
school boards to the extent of insurance coverage, but provided that no suggestion of the existence of insurance coverage was to be permitted at any resulting trial. The trial judge denied the motion on the ground that the
authorizing statute was an unconstitutional encroachment on the rulemaking
authority of the supreme court, severance being a matter of procedure. The
insurer appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal transferred the appeal to the supreme court.90
The supreme court unanimously agreed that the statutory prohibition
against the mention of insurance coverage during trial was unconstitutional
86. 287 So. 2d at 358.

87. 297 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1974).
88. 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973).
89. FLA. STAT. §455.06(2) (1971).
90. 277 So. 2d 604 (4th D.C.A.), appeal transferred,281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1975).
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and affirmed the denial of the motion for severance. 9' Strangely, although this
opinion was issued on the same day as the court's dramatic order in In re
Clarification, holding for the first time that its constitutional rulemaking
authority was exclusive, no mention whatever was made of that proceeding or
order. Rather, the court based its holding in Surette on the then-obsolete prior
wording of article V, which, it will be recalled, had never been construed as
vesting exclusive authority.92 Consistent with its reliance on the prior wording
of the constitution, the court then offered a rationale for the holding in Surette
that was quite incompatible with the notion that its rulemaking authority was
exclusive. The opinion simply stated:
Where rules and construing opinions have been promulgated by this
Court relating to the practice and procedure of all courts and a statutory
provision provides a contrary practice or procedure, as in this case, the
statute must fall .... This portion of Fla. Stat. s. 455.06(2), which pro-

vides for the severance of a political body's insurer[,] relates to joinder
and severance, truly a procedural matter, and 93is therefore superseded
and rendered ineffective as hereinabove set forth.
The court's apparent preference for the obsolete wording of the earlier
constitutional grant of rulemaking authority cannot be explained away as
mere oversight. The opinion expressly acknowledged that there had been a
recent revision by observing in a footnote that "[t]he revised Art. V, effective
January 1, 1973, contains a similar provision in Art. V, s. 2(a)." 9 4 Moreover, the
Surette opinion actually quotes a clarifying statement of the trial judge, prepared at the request of the district court of appeal prior to its transfer of the
appeal to the supreme court, which expressly stated that he was relying on the
newly revised wording of article V and on the notion that the supreme court's
rulemaking authority was exclusive. 9s Whatever the court's motive for relying
on the obsolete wording and rationale, the inevitable result was confusion in
the lower courts. 98
91. 281 So. 2d at 481.
92. See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
93. 281 So. 2d at 483.
94. 281 So. 2d at 482 n.l.
95. 281 So. 2d at 482.
96. The supreme court subsequently receded from its holding in Surette, School Bd. v.
Price, 362 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. 1978), though on grounds not relevant to the present discussion. Other supreme court decisions of the period also contributed to the confusion. For
example, in Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974), the court, in an opinion by Justice
Roberts, explained its holding that the provision of FLA. STAT. §949.10 (1971) purporting to
forbid admission to bail of a probationer who has been arrested on a felony charge was ineffective in the face of a contrary rule of the court, as follows: "Rules of practice and procedure adopted by this Court supercede [sic] any legislative enactment governing practice and
procedure to extent that statute and rule may be inconsistent." Id. at 496. Although this
explanation is quite inconsistent with the notion that the legislature is totally excluded from
the regulation of practice and procedure, the court cited In re Clarification, which held that
the legislature was so excluded. The court also cited cases decided under the prior constitutional grant which had not been held to exclude the legislature from such regulation.
Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka, 149 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1963).
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The First District Court of Appeal exhibited similar uncertainty in its
reception of the new doctrine. In the 1975 case of Johnson v. State,97 that court
considered the appeal of one who had been tried, convicted, and sentenced
without the trial judge having ordered a presentence investigation, as required
by section 921.23 of the Florida Statutes. 8 Rejecting the argument of the appellant that the requirement of such investigation was a matter of substance
and therefore appropriate to legislative control, the court explained that, by
promulgation of Rule 3.710 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, relating to such investigations, the supreme court had already determined that
such investigations were within its rulemaking authority and therefore procedural.99 However, after correctly observing that the supreme court had, in
In re Clarification, "emphasized that the legislature has no constitutional
authority to enact any law relating to practice and procedure, . .

."

the district

court nevertheless concluded that the statute had been superseded only to the
extent it was in conflict with the rule.109 Of course, the conclusion conflicts not
only with the supreme court's holding in In re Clarification,1o' but also with
the district court's own statement of that holding.
However, any doubt that may have been engendered by the opinions just
discussed that the supreme court had meant what it said in the remarkable
order issued in In re Clarificationwas soon dispelled. In 1977, the supreme
court, in Avila South Condominium Ass'n v. Kappa Corp.,102 invalidated a

statute authorizing class actions on behalf of condominium unit owners because it concerned "the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the
product thereof."' 103 Since there was no pre-existing rule of court with which
the statute could have conflicted, the holding was necessarily based on the
exclusiveness of the court's rulemaking power. Similarly, in the 1978 case of
04
a statute purporting to regulate the stage at which an
Markert v. Johnson,1

auto insurer could be joined as co-defendant with the insured 0 was invalidated, not because it conflicted with an existing rule, but because it obviously
dealt with court procedure, 0 6 a subject matter from which the legislature was
considered by the court to be totally excluded.
Justice England had previously given strong expression to the doctrine that
the court's rulemaking authority was exclusive in his concurring opinion in
Boyd v. Green.07 The majority had held unconstitutional on due process
grounds section 918.07 of the Florida Statutes, 08 which provided a bifurcated
trial procedure for adjudicating guilt and insanity in criminal trials. Justice
97.
98.
99.
100.

308 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Ist D.CA. 1975).
FxA. STAT. §921.23 (1973).
308 So. 2d at 129.
Id.

101. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
Id. at 608.
367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).

108.

FIA. STAT.

FLA. STAT.

§627.7262 (1977).

367 So. 2d at 1005-06.
355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978) (England, J., concurring).

§918.017 (1977).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss3/3

16

Means: The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

England concurred in the result, but would have preferred basing the holding
on the ground that the legislature had overstepped constitutional bounds, insisting:
It is our constitutional responsibility alone to prescribe the "course,
form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or steps" by which
the substantive elements of a crime are presented in a criminal proceeding .... I would hold Section [918.017] invalid as an encroachment

on this Court's exclusive power to "adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts." Article V, Section 2(a), Florida Constitution. 0 9
It can only be concluded that the Supreme Court of Florida had seized upon
the recently revised wording of the constitutional grant of rulemaking authority to stake out for itself a substantial area of sovereign authority. By construing
the new language as vesting exclusive authority in the court, it totally excluded the legislature from any positive participation in establishing rules of
practice and procedure in the courts of the state. By adopting the broad, conclusory language of Justice Adkins' definition of the boundary between legislative and judicial lawmaking competence," 0 the court made certain that its
domain would be a spacious one. Whatever the implications may be for its
role in determining public policy, the legislature is effectively excluded from
the regulation of practice and procedure in the courts.
THE DOCTRINE OF EXCLUSIVENESS

CRITICIZED

The notion that the Florida supreme court's constitutional rulemaking
authority is exclusive, in the sense that the legislature is considered as being
totally foreclosed from active participation in the regulation of practice and
procedure in the courts, should be abandoned. This conclusion is supported
by two independent lines of argument. Quite apart from its harmful consequences, this notion was neither warranted by the language of the Florida
Constitution nor intended by those who framed and proposed that language.
On the other hand, quite apart from any question of constitutional interpretation, the notion should be abandoned as constituting a source of inevitable and
widespread confusion and as being inconsistent with democratic principle.
The ConstitutionalLanguage
In its 1973 holding that its own rulemaking authority was exclusive and
that the legislature "has no constitutional authority to enact any law relating
to practice and procedure,""' the Florida supreme court gave no hint whatever
of the reasoning behind this important conclusion. One must therefore conjecture as to the explanation that might have been.
If the constitutional language does support the court's conclusion, it must
do so either expressly or by implication. There seems no basis whatever for
finding an express grant of exclusive authority. Article V, section 2(a) simply
109.
110.
111.

355 So. 2d at 795.
In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972).
In re Clarification, supra note 5.
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provides that "[t]he supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts.. ." and that "[t]hese rules may be repealed by general law
enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature."1 12 Moreover, there is no doubt that the framers of the revised article V
knew how to vest exclusive authority in the court when that is what they intended. For example, section 15 of the same article very forthrightly provides
of
that the court "shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission
11 3
persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted."
Any implied support for the court's conclusion that its rulemaking authority was exclusive would necessarily rest on one or the other of the following
rationales: (1) that absence of an express grant of legislative authority over
practice and procedure implies an intent that the legislature shall not have such
authority;-1 4 (2) that the authority to regulate practice and procedure cannot
coexist in both the court and the legislature, and an express grant was made to
the court; or (5) that application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius'1 5 to one or the other of the components of the constitutional grant of
rulemaking authority 16 implies that the legislature is to be excluded from the
regulation of practice and procedure.
It is commonplace, of course, that as to the legislature, a state constitution
is to be considered as a limitation of authority and not as a grant.117 In other
words, the legislature possesses all authority not denied to it by the constitution
expressly or by implication. Also, the legislature's authority over practice and
procedure in the courts was never challenged prior to 1973, despite the absence
of express constitutional authority.
The notion that authority to regulate practice and procedure cannot reside
simultaneously in the supreme court and the legislature can also be summarily
disposed of. This authority coexisted in both branches of government throughout the history of the state prior to 1973, including the long period when there
112. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, §2(a).
113. Actually, this exclusive authority had been vested in the court since the 1956 revision
of art. V. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. V, §23 (1956). However, since the 1973 revision made ex-

tensive changes to the entire article, including section 23, it is appropriate to attribute the
delegation of exclusive authority to the framers of the latter revision.
114. Far-fetched though this potential rationale for the court's holding may seem, it has
clearly been suggested by the language in the cases. Thus, note the necessary implication of
the statement by Justice Boyd in the recent case of Gonzalez v. Badcock's Home Furnishings
Center, 343 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 1977): "It is true that the Constitution, through Article V, Section

2(a), grants the Legislature only the power to repeal such rules by a two-thirds vote of each
House and that by itself the Legislature has no constitutional authority to enact any law
relating to practice and procedure." See also the statement in Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d 9,

10 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973): "However, the Constitution did not confer upon the legislature the
power to enact or 'adopt' rules for the practice and procedure in the courts, either in Section
2(a) of Article V or elsewhere."
115. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLAcK's LAw DICToNARY 692
(4th ed. 1968).
116. The two components of the constitutional grant are the grant to the court of rulemaking authority and the grant to the legislature of authority to repeal rules of court.
117.

See 16 Am. Jun. 2d ConstitutionalLaw §17 (1974); Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133

So. 2d 735 (Fla.1961); State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50
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was no express constitutional provision,118 and the brief period of 1957-1972,
when there was.119
Courts often warn that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
should only be used "in ascertaining the true meaning of a constitutional or
statutory provision, and not as a rigid rule of universal application."20 Therefore, the maxim should not apply, especially in construing a constitutional
provision as impliedly precluding legislative authority, if there is a rational
alternative explanation for the inclusion of the provision in question.121
Not surprisingly, a plausible alternative reason does exist for the inclusion
in article V, section 2(a) of both of the provisions quoted above. The basic
grant of rulemaking authority to the supreme court was obviously necessary if
the court was to be assigned constitutional responsibility in an area normally
within the competence of the legislative branch. This is especially so in view
of the Florida court's traditionally conservative view concerning the extent of
2z
its inherent rulemaking authority. 2
There was also an adequate alternative justification for including the express authority for legislative repeal of rules of practice and procedure. The
normal product of the legislative process is a statute or legislative resolution,
not a rule of court. During the century and more that the legislature exercised
118.
119.
120.

See text accompanying notes 18-33 supra.
See text accompanying notes 35-110 supra.
Segars v. State, 94 Fla. 1128, 1131, 115 So. 537, 538 (1927).
121. See C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2A §47.23 (4th ed. 1972).
122. In re Promulgation, supra note 20. The conclusion here reached that the express
grant of rulemaking authority to the supreme court carries no necessary implication that
court procedures may not also be regulated by statute finds support from one commentator
who conjectured as to the meaning of a similarly worded proposed amendment to the Illinois
Constitution, reading "[tjhe Supreme Court shall make rules governing practice and procedure
in all courts,":
"Rules of court will supersede and prevail over provisions of statutes dealing with practice
and procedure. The question may arise as to the existence of legislative authority to deal
with matters not covered by rule of court. The proposed new Judicial Article in its express
provisions neither recognizes nor denies such authority. The provisions of the existing Judicial
Article requiring all laws relating to courts to be general, and of uniform operation, have no
counterpart in the proposed new Judicial Article. The provisions of the existing Legislative
Article, however, prohibiting local or special laws regulating the practice in courts of justice
(and by implication permitting general legislation for that purpose), are untouched. It is
the view of the present writer that in the absence of an applicable rule of court, the legislative authority to regulate practice and procedure will remain unimpaired by the proposed new
Judicial Article, but will be limited as at present by said provisions of the Legislative Article,
and qualified as at present by the judicial doctrine as to the unconstitutionality of legislation
'unduly' infringing upon judicial powers." Trumbull, supra note 12, at 455.
One relevant circumstance in Florida is different from the described situation in Illinois.
The 1968 revision of the Florida Constitution did drop from the list of subjects upon which
local and special acts were prohibited the enactment of laws "regulating the practice of courts
of justice .. " FLA CONST. art. III, §20 (1885). However, this is not decisive. Such listing of
subjects prohibited to special and local legislation constituted recognition of existing legislative authority, rather than constituting a grant of such authority. The Florida court must not
have thought the omission decisive, because it did not reach its conclusion as to the exclusiveness of its rulemaking authority until after further revision of article V occurred, in
1973. Also see note 183 infra.
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dominant authority in regulating court procedures, it did so by the enactment
of statutes1 23 If, during the period of legislative dominance, the legislature de-

sired to retain a degree of control over statutorily delegated judicial rulemaking, it was certainly appropriate to require by statute that court-promulgated rules be subject to amendment or repeal by the legislature. 124 Just as
obviously, legislative authority to repeal rules promulgated by the court
pursuant to constitutional authority must be expressly granted in the constitution.
Without the aid of the negative implication of the maxim, then, neither of
the quoted provisions of article V, section 2(a) can be read as forbidding legislation relating to practice and procedure in the courts.
The Intent of the Framers
Since the Florida supreme court's claim of exclusive rulemaking authority
was asserted only after the 1973 revision of article V, it must be assumed that
the claim was based on the revised wording. Did those who proposed the 1973
revision intend the outcome announced by the court's order in In re Clarification? Even a brief examination of the history of the adoption of the 1973 revision will show that they did not.
Limitations of space demand that examination of the history of the
adoption of the 1978 revision of article V be limited to those components 25
that could conceivably have influenced the court's 1973 holding. It is unlikely
that the revised wording of the basic grant of rulemaking authority exerted any
such influence. Indeed, it is arguable that the earlier wording was more conducive to the construction announced by the court than was the revised wording. 26 Observe that the 1957-1972 wording 27 ("[t]he practice and procedure in
all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the supreme court") was
actually rendered literally inaccurate by the continued enactment of statutes
relating to practice and procedure. The result of such enactments was that
practice and procedure was governed, not by rules of court, but by both rules
and statutes. This would not be true with the post-1973 wording; continued
enactment of such statutes would in no way derogate from the literal accuracy
of the words, "[t]he supreme court shall adopt rules .... "128
The second of the listed components of change introduced by the 1973
revision of the constitutional grant of rulemaking authority - the requirement
that there be rules pertaining to specified matters - offers even less potential as
a possible basis for the court's claim of exclusiveness. To the extent that such
requirements tend to undermine the authority of the procedure/substance
dichotomy as the boundary line between judicial and legislative competence,
123. See text accompanying notes 24-33 supra.
124. 1868 Ela. Laws, ch. 1626.
125. See text following note 49 supra.
126. See Wilson, Dreisbach, Brodnax, & Bowen, The Florida Appellate Rules, 11 U. FLA.
L. Rnv. 1, 3 (1958), observing that the constitutional language adopted in 1956 "impliedly
denies any authority, even subordinate, for the legislature to act in this field."

127. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
128. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
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they even serve to undermine the claim of exclusiveness. The inclusion of this
provision reflects doubt whether the items listed were necessarily procedural in
the sense that would bring them within the court's rulemaking authority. Indeed, the court itself had long before authoritatively settled that determination
of the time for seeking appellate review was a matter of substance, outside the
29
rulemaking authority of the court.
Only the third component of change in the revised wording, authorizing
the legislature to repeal rules of practice and procedure by two-thirds vote of
both houses, 30 offers any potential whatever as the basis of the court's later
claim that its authority under the constitutional grant was exclusive. However,
as will be shown, the circumstances and history of the adoption of that provision
militate strongly against any such construction.
Although the record identifies Senate Joint Resolution 52-D (S.J.R. 52-D)
as the vehicle by which the 1971 Florida legislature proposed the revision of
article V approved in the general election of 1972,131 the fact is that S.J.R. 52-D
was proposed in the report of the conference committee, and House Joint
Resolution 11-D (H.J.R. 11-D) was actually the principal vehicle for legislative
32
consideration.
The pertinent provision of H.J.R. 11-D, as originally introduced, read:
"[t]he supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all
courts and for the administrative supervision of all courts which shall govern
unless rescinded by general law."' 1 3 However, early in the special session considering revision of the judicial article, H.J.R. 1 -D was amended by the House
Judiciary Committee to substitute the following for the final phrase authorizing
legislative rescission of the rules: "These rules may be changed by general law
enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature."13 4
It is important to note here the relevance of this change in wording, adopted
early in House consideration of H.J.R. I -D. Whatever may be the implication
for legislative authority over court procedures of the authorization for the legislature to repeal rules of practice and procedure, authorization to change such
rules carries absolutely no implication of intent to terminate or diminish legislative authority to enact statutes relating to practice and procedure in the
courts. Indeed, such authorization for the legislature to "change" rules of
practice and procedure constitutes nearly explicit recognition of a full power
to legislate in the area of court procedure. In short, it is quite evident that the
129. County of Dade v. Saffan, 173 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1965); Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver,
121 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1960); Reed v. Cromer, 98 So. 329 (Fla. 1923).
130. See text following note 50 supra.
131. Fla. S.J.R. 52-D (Spec. Sess. 1971) (adopted March 14, 1972 as FLA. CONsT. art. V;
effective January 1, 1973).
132. Partly for this reason, the following description of the legislative history of the 1973
revision of article V will focus primarily upon the proceedings of the House of Representatives.
Another reason for this focus is that only in the House were the tapes of the floor proceedings
during the special session available for auditing.
133. This wording was evidently taken from H.J. Res. 2567 (1971), which had been
introduced in the preceding regular session, but not passed.
134. Fla. H.R. Jour. 29 (Spec. Sess., Nov. 29, 1971 through Dec. 9, 1971) (emphasis added).
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House committee that proposed this amendment of H.J.R. 11-D, and the
membership that adopted the amendment, were not even considering a grant of
exclusive rulemaking authority to the Florida supreme court.
It is also relevant to note that the House consistently rejected efforts to alter
this provision by amendments from the floor. So rejected was an attempt to
amend H.J.R. 11-D to provide that rules promulgated by the court would be
filed with both houses of the legislature, to become effective after the next
special or regular session unless "rejected by a two-thirds vote of the members
of each house of the legislature."' 135 Another proposed amendment, which would
simply have deleted the entire sentence relating to legislative oversight, was
similarly rejected.36
H.J.R. 1 -D, containing the provision authorizing the legislature to "change"
rules of practice and procedure, passed the House on December 6 by a vote of
eighty to thirty-two and was immediately certified to the Senate. 8 7
The Senate adopted a number of amendments to H.J.R. 1 l-D. The first was
to strike everything after the resolving clause and substitute Senate Joint Resolution 41-D, which was identical to H.J.R. 1 -D as to the provision authorizing
the legislature to change rules of practice and procedure. 13 8 However, amendment 5 then changed that provision to read: "Such rules as adopted by the
supreme court shall be filed with both houses of the legislature and the same
shall become effective thirty days after adjournment of the next regular session
unless rejected by a majority vote of the members of each house of the legislature."18 9 However, the House rejected all of the Senate amendments to H.J.R.
ll-D, including amendment 5, quoted above, and the two houses agreed to
appoint a conference committee' 40
The report of the conference committee on H.J.R. 11-D recommended to
the two houses that they substitute and enact Senate Joint Resolution 52-D
(S.J.R. 52-D), which was attached to the conference committee report.' 4 ' The
language of the rulemaking provision, including that relating to legislative
oversight, was that of the present article V,'4 2 authorizing legislative repeal of
rules of practice and procedure. After the return of the report to the conference
committee for alterations of certain schedule provisions, both houses approved
the report"4 3
The legislative history of the adoption of S.J.R. 52-D lends no support whatever to any notion that the members of the legislature intended the result
ultimately announced by the Florida supreme court, that its rulemaking authority was exclusive. The members of the House consistently supported the
version that would have authorized the legislature to "change" rules of practice
135.
136.
Shreve.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 32-33 (Spec. Sess. 1971). The amendment was introduced by Rep. Savage.
Id. at 33 (Spec. Sess. 1971). The amendment was introduced by Reps. Tubbs and
Id. at 61 (Spec. Sess. 1971).
See text accompanying note 134 supra.
Fla. S. Jour. 36 (Spec. Sess. 1971).
Fla. H.R. Jour. 82 (Spec. Sess. 1971).
Id. at 105.
See text accompanying note 49 supra.
Fla. H.R. Jour. 115 (Spec. Sess. 1971); Fla. S.Jour. 69 (Spec. Sess. 1971).
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and procedure. Then, having rejected attempted amendments by both house
members,14 and the Senate 45 that would either have eliminated legislative oversight of rulemaking altogether or limited the legislature to some procedure for
negating specific rules of the court by veto, rescission, or repeal, the members
of the House were finally confronted with the conference committee report.
Since a conference committee report can only be accepted or rejected in
toto, 1 46 it is questionable whether the members of the House would have risked

the entire revision of article V, even had they been fully informed concerning
the rulemaking provision and desired to reject it. However, the members of the
House were never adequately warned of the possible consequence of the change
to the word "repeal," which had been introduced by the conference committee
report. 47 Indeed, they were encouraged to believe that the House position had
prevailed in the conference committee 48 and certainly had no reason to suspect
that they were authorizing a fundamental change in the balance of power
among the branches of the state government.
Although the Senate conferees were no doubt responsible for the abandonment by the conference committee of the wording that would have authorized
the legislature to "change" rules of practice and procedure, there is some evidence that in so doing they were not expressing any deep-felt conviction on the
144. See text accompanying notes 135-136 supra.
145. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
146. Fla. Sen. Rule 2.19 (1978-80); Fla. H.R. Rule 6.14 (1978-80).
147. The author transcribed the following from House tapes of floor consideration of
the conference committee report. The person speaking was Talbot D'Alemberte, chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee and chairman of the House delegation on the conference
committee on HJR I11-D. What follows constitutes all that was said on the House floor concerning the question of legislative oversight of rulemaking: "Mr. Speaker, the only other
major area of disagreement that kept us so late was the question of rulemaking power.
Basically, I think the House position prevailed on that. There was a modification that I will
point out in detail to the members in just a moment. [Brief discussion of other matters.]
"If you will go to Section 2 and read lines 17 through 19, you'll see where the rulemaking
was handled. That's in SJR 52-D, page 2, lines 17 through 19. The language in this version,
gentlemen, is the House language with two exceptions: The word 'changed' on line 17-it
reads, 'these rules may be repealed by general law.' The House version said, 'these rules may
be changed by general law.' There is also an amendment in the original House version, placed
there by Mr. Whitson, that said that the bill had to be limited to the sole purpose of revising said rules, and when we changed the word 'changed' to 'repeal,' we eliminated that
amendment and for that purpose only. Mr. Whitson's amendment kept the conference committee together for some time, but the language just did not fit when we went to the word
'repealed.' That measure differs from the Senate version which said that the legislature, by
majority vote, may veto the rules. The rules have to be promulgated by the supreme court
under the Senate version, would have to be filed with the legislature, and unless the legislature vetoed them within thirty days, they would then become the controlling rules. But there
would never be any chance, under the Senate version, in the future for the legislature to act,
and that was offensive to the conferees of the House, and that was one of the things I
wouldn't have wanted to come back with another position on."
It seems evident from Mr. D'Alemberte's remarks that he and the other conferees were
concerned primarily - perhaps solely- with assuring continuing legislative ability to negate
possible judicial incursions into matters of substantive law. There is no evidence that the
possibility of the loss by the legislature of its ability to deal with issues of public policy that
happened to be involved with court procedures even occurred to them.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 3
1980]

REGULATING FLORIDA COURTS

part of the Senate membership. It is worth noting that the original Senate
vehicle for the article V revision, Senate Joint Resolution 41-D, also contained
the wording that would have authorized the legislature to "change" rules of
procedure. 49
An episode tending to cast doubt as to the depth of Senate support for the
change to the word "repeal" involved an amendment to H.J.R. 1 -D offered in
the Senate. Following Senate adoption of the series of fifteen amendments to
H.J.R. ll-D, a further amendment No. 16 was offered. 15° This amendment,
which would have stricken everything after the resolving clause and substituted
an entirely different version of article V, including a provision authorizing the
legislature to "change" rules of practice and procedure, was actually approved
by a vote of 24 to 21, l and the Senate proceeded to the third reading of the
resolution as so amended.52 However, the Senate then reconsidered the vote
by which it had placed the amended resolution on third reading, and the proposed amendment No. 16 was temporarily deferred.53 Although the amendment was never brought up again, the near adoption certainly tends to negate
any notion that the Senate membership felt very deeply concerning the form
that legislative oversight of rulemaking was to take. Finally, it appears from
correspondence in the file of the House Judiciary Committee that the chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee was quite satisfied with the wording that
would have authorized the legislature to change rules of procedure, preferring
only that such changes be accomplished by a majority, rather than two-thirds,
of the membership.15 4
It is appropriate also to examine the intent of the framers of the 1973 revision in terms of the evil toward which the change in wording was directed. 5
The most authoritative spokesman on this score would seem to be Representative Talbot D'Alemberte, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which
took the initiative in developing the 1971 legislative proposals for revision of
article V,256 and also chairman of the House conferees. Throughout the period
of legislative deliberation and into the pre-referendum period, Representative
D'Alemberte repeatedly explained that the oversight provision was directed
against possible judicial abuse. The following is typical:

148. Id.
149.

Fla. S. Jour. 32 (Spec. Sess. 1971).

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 58.

154. Letter from Janet Reno, Staff Director of the House Judiciary Committee, to Sen.
Barron, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 23, 1971) (House Judiciary Committee file #13, Florida State University Law Library, Special Materials section). See also
notes of meeting of D'Alemberte, Barron, and the governor on November 17, 1971, which do
not indicate that the rulemaking provision was even discussed. Id., file #6.
155. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); Orlando Sports
Stadium, Inc. v. State, 262 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1972); State Bd. of Accountancy v, Webb, 51 SO, 2d
296 (Fla. 1951); McCamy v. Payne, 94 Fla. 210, 116 So. 267 (1928).
156. See text accompanying notes 131-132 supra,
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What everyone does seem to want is a sound system of checks and balances and, in this context, checks against any future court which under
the guise of its rulemaking power, attempts to legislate in the area of
substantive law. Under the present constitution there is no check over
such a court. The basic problem, then, is to draft a provision which
would serve as a check against a court which would use its power over
"practice and procedure" to invade the substantive area. In our current
draft, we propose a very limited check which is exercised by adopting a
general law by a two-thirds vote of the membership of each House. The
governor could veto this law and the veto would have to be overriden by
retaining the two-thirds vote which as you know is very difficult. 157
The "current draft" referred to was that authorizing the legislature to "change"
rules of practice and procedure. However, essentially the same explanation was
expressed in letters 158 and articles 59 after substitution of the conference committee concept of "repeal." Throughout, the stated purpose was to safeguard
against judicial, not legislative, abuse.6 0
Actually, there is evidence in the House Judiciary Committee files' 6 ' suggesting that the Florida supreme court itself was influential, if not instrumental, in bringing about the change in wording that substituted "repeal" for
"change" in the legislative oversight provision. As early as June 24, 1971, several months prior to the special session that proposed the revision of article V,
Chief Justice B. K. Roberts wrote as follows to Chairman D'Alemberte of the
House Judiciary Committee:
Frankly, I am opposed to the proposal as outlined because it tends to
make the Judicial Branch almost entirely subservient to the Legislature.
My concept of government is that it is divided between the Executive,
Legislative and Judicial branches and that each is to a large degree
autonomous. The Legislature prescribes the rules for its operation, the
Cabinet prescribes the rules of operation for the Executive, and the
Supreme Court prescribes rules for the Judicial, and frankly, I do not
believe there is any more logic in having the Legislature write the rules
for the Judiciary than there1would be in having the Supreme Court write
the rules for the Legislature. 62
157. Letter from Talbot D'Alemberte, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to
Wilfred Varn, Tallahassee Attorney (Nov. 24, 1971) (House Judiciary Committee files, Florida
State University Law Library, Special Collections).
158. Letters from Talbot D'Alemberte, House Judiciary Committee Chairman, to John P.
McKeever, of Ocala (Dec. 16, 1971); to Jack Roberts, of the Miami News (June 26, 1972); and
to the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers (Mar. 2, 1972) (House Judiciary Committee files,
Florida State University Law Library, Special Collections).
159. D'Alemberte, Judicial Reform -Now or Never, 46 FLA. B.J. 68, 69-70 (1972).
160. This conclusion is not invalidated by the circumstance that there is evidence, in the
above quotation and elsewhere, see letter to Jack Roberts, supra note 158, indicating that
Representative D'Alemberte was apparently under the mistaken impression that the court's
rulemaking authority under the then-existing constitutional language was already exclusive.
The point here is that it was not the intent of the framers of the 1973 revision to increase the
authority of the supreme court at the expense of the legislative branch, contrary to what the
Florida supreme court subsequently held. In re Clarification, supra note 5.
161. Florida State University Law Library, Special Collections.
162. House Judiciary Committee files, Florida State University Law Library, Special

Collections, file #13, part 2.
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Holding such rigorous views of the separation of powers, the Chief Justice
could certainly be expected to be offended by the sweeping authorization of
legislative intervention contained in the early drafts. Elsewhere in the committee files, on the margin of a draft of the revision apparently used in a conference with the justices, there appears the notion, "B.K. opposed."1 63 However,
as the special session drew near, Representative D'Alemberte expressed some
confidence concerning the position of the Chief Justice.m 4
Although the absence from the committee files of any statement of opposition by other members of the high court certainly does not mean that there was
no such opposition, there is some indication that certain of the other justices
did not oppose an authority in the legislature to change rules of practice and
procedure. For instance, on the margin of a draft of the revision apparently
used in a consultation with Justice Adkins appears the notation, "Adkins OK
now but hard to sell C.J."'165 A letter from Justice Carlton discussed various
aspects of the revision, but made no mention whatever of the rulemaking
problem.' 66
Nevertheless, the impression persists that the court or some of its members
exerted some influence in the abandonment of language authorizing the legislature to change rules and substitution therefor of the narrower authority to
repeal such rules. The House committee's staff director was quite specific when
she later reported:
By changing the provision by using the word "repealed" rather than
"changed," I think the conference committee satisfied the Supreme
Court and others here who had been particularly concerned with the
rulemaking provision. The Supreme Court has indicated it will support
and speak for the resolution between now and March 14. Under the
present language, the legislature would not be able to make rules; it
able to check, by repealing, any abuse on the part of a
would only 1be
67
future court.
Whatever the source of the final wording, the evidence seems quite dear
that the legislature - especially the House of Representatives - was not in any
sense attempting to enlarge the rulemaking authority of the court beyond what
it had previously been. At the very most the purpose was only to safeguard

against judicial abuse by providing for continuing legislative oversight. In
sum, the history of the adoption of the 1972 amendment militates strongly
against the court's claim that its rulemaking authority is exclusive.
163. Id., file #2.
164. D'Alemberte wrote: "In our conversation with the Chief Justice he has indicated
that he would not have strong objection to a provision which would allow two-thirds of the
membership of each House of the Legislature with the Governor concurring to change any

rule of the court. We are working with the court in this area and I think we can arrive at a
satisfactory rulemaking provision. I talked with the Chief Justice Monday and he feels we can
reach agreement on all the issues of concern to the court." Letter from Talbot D'Alemberte
to J.B. Spence (Nov. 10, 1971) (House Judiciary Committee files, Florida State University
Law Library, Special Collections).
165. Id., file #3(b).
166. Id., file #13, part 2.
167. Letter to James Crowder, of Miami (Dec. 21, 1971). Id., file #13.
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The Legacy of Confusion
It is difficult to imagine a verbal boundary separating two mutually exclusive areas of authority that would not inevitably constitute a source of confusion. Unless such a boundary could be precisely defined, there would necessarily be a gray area between the two areas of authority, with resulting confusion over whether particular matters lay within the one or the other. However, if the areas of authority were not mutually exclusive, as here, but represented areas of concurrent authority, the imprecision of the verbal boundary
line separating them would not greatly matter. Presumably, one authority or
the other would prevail in event of conflict. Therefore, any resulting confusion
would be limited to statutes or rules that were in conflict, and such confusion
could be readily reconciled in favor of the dominant authority.
The distinction between substance and procedure actually enjoys something
of a natural monopoly as the boundary line separating legislative authority
from the judicial rulemaking power, because it is difficult to imagine an alternative verbal boundary. After all, the basic function of court rules is to
regulate practice and procedure in the courts. How state it otherwise?
The inherent imprecision of the distinction between substance and procedure is much too notorious to require elaboration here.168 "IfMt is simplistic
to assume that all law is divided neatly between 'substance' and 'procedure.' ",169
7 0
At other times, this has even been realized by the Florida supreme courtY.
Rejecting an early petition of the Florida State Bar Association for the court
to adopt new rules of civil procedure as an exercise of its inherent authority
168. See Green, supra note 3,at 483: "Procedural law can be only vaguely defined; it is
adjective law, it is auxiliary to the substantive law and provides the method of enforcing
substantive rights; a given rule may be treated as dealing with a substantive right in one case
and with procedure in another, because of the difference between the ultimate questions in
the two cases. The answer to the question, 'What is procedure?' depends upon the answer to
another question, 'Why do you want to know?'"
Also instructive is the comment by Smith & Ehrhardt, Proposed Code of Evidence, 48 FLA.
1.J. 13 (1974). Smith was executive director of the Florida Law Revision Commission, which
submitted the new Florida Evidence Code, and Ehrhardt was reporter for the project. "Questions of substance v. procedure have been debated for years, and no one has ever been able to
draw a clear dividing line. . . . More importantly, even if a line could be drawn, the substance and procedure of the law of evidence are often too interwoven to be separated. A code
of evidence must contain both substance and procedure, so its promulgation must be a
cooperative effort between the legislature and the Supreme Court." Id. at 14. Of course, by
the time this was written, the court, by its holding that its rulemaking authority was exclusive, had already rendered such cooperative effort impossible.
Finally, see the conflicting opinions of the Second District Court of Appeal in In re S.R., a
Child v. State, 336 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977) and the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
In re S.L.M., a Child, 336 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976) concerning whether FA. STAT.
§39.05(7) (1975), requiring dismissal with prejudice of any petition alleging delinquency that
was not filed within 30 days of the date the complaint was referred to the intake office of the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, was procedural or substantive. On review,
the supreme court held that it was substantive. In re S.R., a Child v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018
(Fla. 1977).
169. Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 364, 307 A.2d 571, 578 (1973).
170. In re Promulgation, supra note 20.
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over practice and procedure in the courts, Chief Justice Terrell wrote for the
court:
The limits of procedural and substantive law have not been defined and
no two would agree where the one leaves off and the other begins. There
is also between the two a hiatus or twilight zone that has been constantly entered by the courts and the Legislatures....
Another element that lends confusion to the situation is that the current of substantive law and procedural law often coalesce. What is regarded as substantive law today may become procedural law tomorrow,
and vice versa. Conflicts on this point have given rise to powers that are
said to be not strictly legislative or judicial and when this is the case, the
power of the Legislature is dominant. 1
Of course this statement was written before there was any thought of the court's
receiving a constitutional grant of rulemaking authority and at a time when
the court acknowledged the Legislature's supremacy over the regulation of
practice and procedure. However, this does not alter the basic relationship
between substance and procedure. There is no reason to believe that the distinction between them can be defined with any greater precision today than at
the time when Chief Justice Terrell wrote. It was an inappropriate boundary
line then, and it still is.
It is little wonder, then, that there has been growing confusion and doubt
concerning the constitutional validity of important legislation. A notable example concerns the statute providing for bifurcated procedures for imposing
sentence for capital crimes .77 A recent article'7 argued that section 921.141 of
the Florida Statutes had already been held to be procedural in nature by the
Florida supreme court 74 and was therefore unconstitutional under the rule of
5
The author noted that a "considerable number" of
In re Clarification.17
prisoners had been sentenced under the unconstitutional statute and advocated
171. Id. at 59.
172. FLA. STAT. §921.141 (1977).
173. Yetter, The FloridaDeath Penalty. Is It Unconstitutional Under State Law?, 52 FLA.
BJ. 372 (1978).
174. Lee v. State, 294 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 340 So. 2d 474
(Fla. 1976).
175. 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973). The article's view that the statute is unconstitutional
under the court's rulings that its rulemaking authority is exclusive is supported by a recent
statement of one of the Florida justices. FLA. STAT. §918.017 similarly provided that in any
criminal trial, when the accused intends to plead not guilty and rely on the defense of insanity, no evidence of insanity may be admitted until after it is established that the accused
is guilty of committing, or attempting to commit, the criminal act. After the latter question
is determined, a separate trial is provided, before the same or different jury, on the issue of
insanity. In State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978), the Florida supreme court
held that the provision for a separate trial of the issue of insanity was unconstitutional as
denying the accused due process of law. Justice England concurred, but would have preferred holding the statute invalid as an attempted legislative encroachment on the court's
exclusive rulemaking authority. The justice remarked: "It is our constitutional responsibility
alone to prescribe the 'course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or steps'
by which the substantive elements of a crime are presented in a criminal proceeding." Id. at
795.
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that the court hold the statute unconstitutional and promulgate a new rule in
its place. At least two prisoners have challenged the statute on the suggested
ground J?6 However, the court had not ruled on the question at this writing.
The most notable example of the kind of confusion resulting from the
court's holding that its rulemaking power is exclusive, however, is the
conundrum that the Florida Evidence Code has become. Originally developed
as a project of the Florida Law Revision Commission, this complete code of
evidence was enacted by the 1976 legislature,177 to become effective July 1, 1977.
The effective date of the new code was subsequently postponed to July 1,
1979.178

On June 28, 1979, just prior to the new Code's finally becoming effective,
the supreme court issued an order temporarily adopting, as rules, "the provisions of the evidence code as enacted by Chapter 76-237, Laws of Florida, and
subsequently amended by Chapters 77-77, 77-174, 78-361, and 78-379, Laws of
Florida, to the extent that they are procedural . ."1791
". The expressed reason
for such blanket adoption was "[t]o avoid multiple appeals and confusion in
the operation of the courts caused by assertions that portions of the evidence
code are procedural and, therefore, unconstitutional because they have not
been adopted by this Court under its rule-making authority .
180 The order
concluded:
[Wie request The Florida Bar, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers,
and other interested parties to file any appropriate suggestions or objections on or before October 1, 1979, directed to specific rules of evidence
contained in the code and stating (1) the basis why the challenged rule
is procedural rather than substantive, and (2) why the rule is inappropriate in its present form.",'
Actually, the current dilemma concerning the Florida Evidence Code
epitomizes quite accurately the consequences of the court's claim that its rulemaking authority is exclusive. Although the court acknowledged in its June
28 order that the evidence code contains some elements that are substantive
and therefore appropriate to legislative regulation,182 and although the Florida
176. Goodwin v. State, Case No. 55,086, argued June 6, 1979; Vaught v. State, Case No.
52,835, argued January 9, 1979.
177. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-237 (current version at FLA. STAT. ch. 90 Supp. 1978).
178. This was accomplished by successive postponements to July 1, 1978, by 1977 Fla.
Laws, ch. 77-77; to January 1, 1979, by 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-361; and to July 1, 1979, by 1978
Fla. Laws, ch. 78-379.
179. In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979).
180. Id. at 1369.
181. Id. at 1369-70.
182. Since its only purpose was to avoid assertions that portions of the code are procedural
and therefore unconstitutional, the June 28 order would have been unnecessary but for the
court's prior holding that its rulemaking authority was exclusive. Id. at 1369. Compare the
attitude of the New Jersey supreme court, known for its aggressiveness as to its rulemaking
authority, as expressed in Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973). The court was
illustrating the flexibility that it enjoyed as a result of its refusal up to then to rule that its
rulemaking authority was exclusive: "We participated in a process whereby a code of evidence
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Constitution elsewhere recognizes the existence of some measure of legislative

authority over rules of evidence, 8 3 this would be difficult to reconcile with
recent precedents defining the extent of the court's rulemaking authority 8 4

Read literally, and also as applied in subsequent appellate opinions, the broad
guidelines laid down by Justice Adkins in his concurring opinion in In re
185
would certainly seem to include the
FloridaRules of Criminal Procedure

entire Evidence Code 8 within the sweep of "practice and procedure." Insofar
as the code relates to criminal matters, it certainly "provides or regulates the
steps by which one who violates a criminal statute is punished."' 8 7 It "pertains

to the legal machinery by which substantive law is made effective."18 s It has to
do with "the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the product
thereof."' 8 9 It certainly constitutes part of the rules "governing the parties, their
counsel and the Court throughout the progress of the case from the time of its
initiation until final judgment and its execution."'10
In view of the obvious difficulty of defining the distinction between sub-

stance and procedure, 191 it is little wonder that the response to the court's invitation for suggestions as to the labelling of individual sections of the Code
was disappointing. In a "Clarifying Opinion," issued November 8, 1979,92 the
was adopted 'wholesale,' to use a word in the quotation above from Winberry. The rules of
evidence were adopted cooperatively by the three branches of government under the Evidence Act, ... after the Supreme Court and the legislature conducted their separate studies.
Under the statutory arrangement, some of the rules, notably those embodying privileges, were
fixed in the statute itself while other rules, prepared by the Court after consideration at a
Judicial Conference, were filed with the Legislature to become effective unless disapproved by
a joint resolution signed by the Governor. Thus we did not puisue to a deadlock the question
whether 'evidence' was 'procedural' and therefore, according to the Winberry dictum [that the
Court's authority as to practice and procedure is exclusive], the sole province of the Supreme
Court. Nor were we deterred by the spectre of the criticism that, if 'evidence' is 'substantive,'
it was unseemly or worse for the Court to participate in the 'wholesale' promulgation of
substantive law. The single question was whether it made sense thus to provide for the administration of justice, and the answer being clear, we went ahead." Id. at 367-68, 807 A.2d at
580.
183. FLA. CoNsr. art. MI,§11, includes "rules of evidence in any court" in a list of subject matters concerning which special legislation is prohibited. Prior to the 1956 constitutional
delegation of rulemaking authority, the court recognized the listing of "regulating the practice
of courts of justice" in the corresponding section of the Constitution of 1885 as providing -a
strong constitutional basis for the legislature's superior authority over the regulation of practice in the courts. In re Promulgation 199 So. 57, 58 (Fla. 1940).
184. See, e.g., Markert v. Johnson, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978); Avila S. Condominium
Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977); In re Clarification, supranote 5.
185. 272 So. 2d 65, 65 (Fla. 1972).
186. "A 'rule of evidence' may be defined to be the mode and manner of proving the
competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in
judicial procedure." 31 C.J.S. Evidence §2 (1964).
187. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J.,
concurring) (quoting State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 66; Avila S. Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599, 608 (Fla.

1977).
190. 272 So.2d at 66.
191. See note 168 supra.
192. In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla.1979) (clarifying opinion).
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court reported that the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, after receiving
reports from the Judicial Administration Selection and Tenure Committee, had
advised the court that "the Florida Evidence Code on the whole is a good work
product and ... there was no specific recommendations as to suggested changes
in, or objections, [sic]) to [,] specific rules"'19 and that it is the position of the
Bar "that objections to individual rules, based on content[,] can best be
handled on a case-by-case basis."'19 This is eloquent testimony to the utter
hopelessness of the court's effort to bring order to the Florida Evidence Code.
Additional evidence of the same conclusion can be seen in the court's admission
in its November 8th order that it was powerless to change the applicability
provision of the evidence code "without first finding the entire Code to be
procedural."19 5
Wholesale adoption of the provisions of the Code "to the extent that they
are procedural," whether temporarily or permanently, is only an expedient and
really amounts to an abdication of the spirit of the court's obligation under
section 2(a) of article V, if not its letter. Whether or not the constitutional grant
is exclusive, it certainly assumes that rulemaking will occur by deliberative
procedures of some kind on the part of the court and its agencies.
There are also practical problems. Such a blanket adoption of statutes as
rules of the court fails to inform practitioners of which statutes have been so
adopted. Nevertheless, those adopted are supposedly thereafter removed from
the power of the legislature to amend. 196 Of course, the confusion is compounded when the blanket treatment is of the routine type normally made a
part of a rules revision and worded substantially as follows: "[S]tatutes not
superseded shall remain in effect as rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court."' 9 7 The statutory sections continue to be published in the Florida
Statutes. The user has no way of knowing whether a particular section has
been superseded or continued as a rule. More important, the legislature has no
way of knowing whether a particular section is subject to amendment or appeal.
It has even been conjectured that a particular statute may have been superseded in part and continued in part by such a blanket adoption.19s Even with
specific adoptions, it is possible for the court to change its mind as to whether a
particular matter is substantive or procedural. 99
The inevitable confusion resulting from the present division between legislative authority and the judicial rulemaking power has even infected the court
itself. In a series of recent cases, the court has exhibited either confusion or
lack of full commitment to its original position concerning the exclusiveness of
its authority to regulate practice and procedure.
193.

Id. at 1161.

194. Id.
195. Id. at 1162.
196.

In re Clarification, supra note 5, at 205.

197. In re Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 345 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1977).
198. Nash, FloridaAppeal Times, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 24, 40 (1961).
199. See In re Supplemental Petition for Changes In the Florida Rules of Probate and
Guardianship Procedure, 344 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1977); Benyard v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 473
(Fla. 1975); State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
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One such aberration occurred in the 1978 case of School Board of Broward
00
in which the court was reviewing an order severing an inCounty v. Price,2
surer as codefendant in an action brought against a school board and the
insurer. The order for severance was granted on the authority of section
230.23(9)(d) of the Florida Statutes, which authorized school boards to secure
liability insurance and automatically waived sovereign immunity to the extent
of coverage so secured, but forbade any mention of insurance coverage during
any resulting trial201
The court had previously held other, substantially identical statutes to be
procedural in nature and therefore invalid, either as having been superseded by
a pre-existing contrary rule of the court 2 2 or as an attempted encroachment
on the exclusive rulemaking authority of the supreme court.203 In the Price
case, however, the court unanimously upheld the statutory prohibition against
the mention of insurance coverage during trial.2 04 Observing that the statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity is effective only if insurance coverage is not
mentioned to the jury, the court continued:
The statute's proviso sets the bounds of the substantive right to sue a
political subdivision of the state. And it conditions the waiver. Thus,
the proviso is substantive, in that it delineates a substantive right.
We do not ignore our statement in Sparkman. The prohibition of the
statute is surely procedural, just as it is substantive. But, given the Legislature's power to enact the prohibition as a condition to waiving
sovereign immunity and, in order to honor the separation of powers in
will not strike it from the general
this State's constitutional scheme, 20we
5
law. The proviso is constitutional.
20 6
The court expressly receded from its prior holding in Surette.
It is probably too soon after the holding in Price to attempt a full assessment
of its importance in terms of its effect on the supreme court's rulemaking
authority. However, viewed abstractly and pushed to its logical extreme, the
principle expressed seems to be incompatible with the court's claim of exclusive
rulemaking authority. After all, every mandatory procedure is a precondition
in some degree to the realization of some substantive right. The only basis for
distinguishing the situation confronting the court in Price and that suggested
by any other mandatory procedure is that it would be unlikely for the latter to
have been prescribed by the same legislative act that created the substantive
right to which it is a condition.

200. 362 So. 2d 1337 (FMa. 1978).
201. FLA. STAT. §230.23(9)(d)2 (1977).
202. School Bd. of Broward County v. Surette, 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973). See text accompanying note 88 supra.
203. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976). The court held the statute to be
beyond the legislature's power as procedural, but upheld its application by adopting the
statute as a rule of procedure. Id.
204. 362 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1978). The opinion was written by Justice Boyd. Neither of the
authors of the two prior opinions participated, Justice McCain, the author of the opinion in
Surette, having resigned from the court, and Justice B.K. Roberts having retired.
205. 362 So. 2d at 1339.
206. Id.
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A second episode illustrating what appears to be self-doubt on the part of
the court created confusion by suggesting that the legislature may sometimes
be able to do the very thing that the court had expressly held it was powerless
to do - i.e., amend, as well as repeal, existing rules of procedure. The narrative
begins with the enactment of section 903.132 of the Florida Statutes 207 by the
1969 Legislature. With the obvious purpose of protecting the public from repeat criminal offenders, the new statute prohibited a court from admitting to
bail previously convicted felons whose civil rights had not been restored.
In the 1974 case of Bamber v. State,20 the Second District Court of Appeal
reviewed a trial court's denial, on the authority of section 903.132, of a motion
for the setting of bail. The district court of appeal held that entitlement to bail
was a procedural matter and therefore not within the competence of the legislature to regulate. Therefore, the district court concluded, the matter was controlled by Rule 3.691(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provided
that "a person may be denied bail upon appeal from conviction of a felony if
20 9
such person had previously been convicted of a felony."
The 1976 legislature thereupon amended section 903.132 in several respects
not relevant to the holding in Bamber, but retained, in the form of a proviso,
the statutory prohibition against the admission to bail of a previously convicted
felon.210 Then, by section 2 of the same act, the legislature repealed Rule
3.691(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and another rule bearing
on the same subject matter, 211 "insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of section 903.132 of the Florida Statutes, as amended by section 1 of
this act." 2' 2 By a series of "whereas clauses" preceding the enacting clause, the
act recited the original enactment of section 903.132 as "a means of protecting
the citizens of this state from repeat offenders,"21 3 and its invalidation in
Bamber,214 and concluded by observing that "it is now encumbent upon the
Legislature to clarify to the courts its intent to prohibit the exercise of discretion in cases in which the Legislature believes the greater interest is in the
protection of the citizens of this state ....215
Here were all the makings of a direct confrontation between the legislature
and the Florida supreme court over the authority to regulate admission to bail.
Strangely, the court refused the challenge and quietly acquiesced in this amendment of one of its rules by a legislature it had previously held possessed only
the power to repeal such rules. The court simply remarked, "Ch. 76-138, s. 2,
Laws of Florida, by appropriate vote, repealed the provisions of Rule 3.691,
insofar as they were inconsistent with the legislative act. This rule has been

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

1969 Fla. Laws 1111, ch. 69-307.
300 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).
Id. at 270.
1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-138.
Id. §2.
Id.
1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-138.
Id.
Id.
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amended so as to include the provisions of Ch.76-138, Laws of Florida." 21 6 It
is worth noting that the court's acquiescence did not occur in an adversary
proceeding in which the expectations of a party would have been disappointed.
Even so, it is strange that the court did not at least question whether what the
legislature did amounted to the repeal of a rule. It is certainly arguable that
"repeal to the extent inconsistent" with something is actually an amendment.
A third episode represents perhaps less a withdrawal from the full rigor of
its earlier position than an example of the court's simply failing to have the
courage of its convictions. Reference here is to the provision of Rule 1.010 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, to the effect that "the form, content, procedure, and time for pleading in all special statutory proceedings shall be as
prescribed by the statutes providing for such proceedings unless these rules
specifically provide to the contrary."
Although the origin of this provision antedates the constitutional delegation
of rulemaking authority to the court, its continued application subsequent to
the court's holding that its rulemaking authority was exclusive can be justified
only as an attempted delegation of rulemaking authority by the court to the
legislature. The courts have so applied the provision in at least two cases. In
the 1975 case of Lane v. Brith,2'7 the Fourth District Court of Appeal relied
upon Rule 1.010 in upholding the validity of section 83.59 of the Florida
Statutes, providing for summary procedures in landlord and tenant actions,
against a claim that it was an invalid encroachment on the court's exclusive
rulemaking authority.
218
In the 1977 case of Gonzalez v. Babcock's Home Furnishings Center, the

Florida supreme court denied certiorari to review an order of the trial court
denying a motion to quash service in a replevin action tried pursuant to procedures set out in section 78.065(2) of the Florida Statutes. 21 9 The appellant
argued that the statute was invalid because "the Legislature has absolutely no
positive rule-making power over procedural court rules." 220 Justice Boyd, writing for the Court, responded:
The answer to her argument is quite simple.
It is true that the Constitution, through article V, Section 2(a), grants
the Legislature only the power to repeal such rules by a two-thirds vote
of each House and that by itself the Legislature has no constitutional
authority to enact any law relating to practice and procedure. In re
Clarificationof FloridaRules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204

(Fla. 1973). However, this Court has adopted Rule 1.010, Fla.R.Civ.P.,
which provides that the form, content, procedure and time for pleadings
in all statutory special proceedings (such as replevin) shall be prescribed
by the statutes for such proceedings, unless the civil rules specifically
provide to the contrary. 221
216. The Florida Bar re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 343 So. 2d 1247, 1262 (Fla.

1977).
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

313 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975).
343 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1977) (Boyd, J.).
F A. STAT. §78.065(2) (1975).
343 So.2d at 8.
Id.
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It is interesting that a court that is so astute to prevent the unconstitutional
delegation of power by another branch of government22 2 can be so insensitive
to the constitutional infirmities of its own delegations. By every criterion by
which the court has judged delegations of legislative authority, its own delegation in this instance was invalid. Was the delegation justified by the impracticality of dealing in the first instance with a complex problem for which great
flexibility was required? 223 But the court itself was the center of expertise and
was also closer to the problem than the entity to which the delegation was
attempted. Was the delegation attended by meaningful standards?22 4 Indeed,
there were no standards whatever. Could the delegation without meaningful
standards be justified on the ground that the authority being delegated was not
exclusively judicial?225 Hardly; the court had previously proclaimed that the
regulation of practice and procedure was the exclusive prerogative of the
court.226 If the legislature lacked constitutional authority to enact any law
relating to practice and procedure, it is difficult to understand how such authority could be vested in the legislature by the Florida supreme court.
To repeat, confusion is inevitable when mutually exclusive areas of "legislative authority" are divided by a verbal boundary that cannot be defined with
precision. It is doubtful that the confusion could be eliminated by an alteration of the verbal boundary. However, the confusion attending the Florida
supreme court's rulemaking authority would substantially disappear immediately upon abandonment of the notion that the authority is exclusive.
Conflict with DemocraticPrinciple
Democratic principle assigns the primary role in the determination of
public policy to the legislative branch of Florida government. Therefore, any
arrangement that effectively transfers a significant portion of the legislature's
power to determine public policy to the supreme court is contrary to this
organizing principle. It's as simple as that.
The Florida supreme court's holding that its rulemaking authority is exclusive 227 was on a collision course with democratic principle from the instant
it was announced. Conflict between the court's holding and democratic principle was inevitable for the reason that the existence or absence of policy issues
appropriate to legislative determination is completely independent of the
222. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
223. Department of Citrus v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1970); State v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908).
224. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
225. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, the Adoption of Rules of Practice and Procedure,
21 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1945). Justice Terrell, writing for the court, rejected the assertion
that 1943 Fla. Laws, ch. 21995, by which the legislature had delegated rulemaking authority
to the court, was invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. He stated
that the constitutional prohibition against the delegation of authority applied only to "strictly
legislative" authority. However, in view of the courts' involvement in rulemaking by virtue
of their inherent authority, the power over court procedures could not be "strictly legislative."
Therefore, the usual constraints against the delegation of legislative authority did not apply.
226. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
227. Id.
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verbal boundary - i.e., the distinction between substance and procedure - that
separates the legislative and judicial spheres of lawmaking authority.
In otherwords, policy issues appropriate to legislative determination are as
likely to appear on the procedural side of the boundary as on the substantive
side. As Justice Frankfurter expressed it, "[t]he history of American freedom is,
in no small measure, the history of procedure." 228 The American Bar Association's Committee on Standards of Judicial Administration considered the relationship of policy to procedure in the specific context of the judicial rulemaking authority:
All procedural rules have some effects, often very significant ones, on the
enjoyment of substantive rights. Hence, all procedural rules have substantive legal implications. At the same time, because substantive legal
rules ordinarily imply the possibility of enforcement by judicial procedures, almost all substantive law has procedural implications.
These interconnections make it impossible to define the scope of the
rulemaking power in precise and enduring terms. Furthermore, some
clearly procedural rules are of such great general significance that they
should not be modified except by a procedure, such as legislation or constitutional revision, that involves general political assent. The right to
jury trial, for example, is in this category.
be
The proper boundaries of the rulemaking power must therefore
2
worked out by processes that go beyond strict legal definition. 29
"Procedure conditions and determines legal relations. The substantive importance of judicial procedure to society lies in the fact that it conditions and
determines the way in which judicial power is made operational. This is a
matter of great popular concern."2 3 0 In any event, the inevitability with which
substance and procedure are intertwined is sufficiently recognized- 1 that it
needs no further elaboration here. It is utterly hopeless to attempt to reconcile
any notion of an exclusive judicial rulemaking authority with generally accepted tenets of democracy.
The Florida supreme court has never denied that important issues of public
policy may often arise in connection with court procedures, and it has never
disavowed its authority to deal with such issues in place of the legislature.
Normally, the court simply asserts its authority to regulate the matter which it
has labeled procedural, without commenting one way or the other on the possible existence of policy issues. Thus has the court held it within its own rulemaking authority to decide whether a person charged with a crime for which
the death penalty may be imposed should be permitted to waive his right to
228. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See
also State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 353 A.2d 723, 744 (1974) (Bogdanski, J., dissenting)

("For separation of powers purposes, the distinction between 'substance' and 'procedure' is
illusory. The problem is not that the line between the two is imprecise. Rather, questions of
'procedure' may and often do present basic issues of public policy above and beyond the
subject of efficient judicial administration.').
229. ABA Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating to
Court Organization 75 (1974).
230. C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCnON 1 §3.27 (4th ed. 1972).
231. See note 168 supra.
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trial by jury;2 32 whether there should be some procedure other than physical
arrest for dealing with persons charged with misdemeanors or other minor
violations2 33 whether juries in damage actions should be insulated against
learning of insurance coverage in the course of a trial for damages;2 3 4 whether
there are circumstances in which children should not be confined in adult penal
facilities2 35 and whether, when a person on parole or probation for a felony
conviction is arrested for a new felony, his release on bail should be delayed
2 36
until after a hearing on revocation of his parole or probation.
However, there is substantial evidence that the supreme court is well aware
of its recently expanded role in the determination of policy issues. Indeed, even
before its 1973 holding that its authority over the regulation of practice and
procedure was exclusive, the court exhibited a ready willingness to pursue its
new role aggressively through the exercise of its rulemaking authority.
In the 1969 case of Shingleton v. Bussey, 237 the court affirmed the reversal of
the trial court's dismissal of an insurance company as a codefendant in an
action against its insured arising out of an automobile collision. In so ruling,
the court established, as a matter of public policy in this state, that insurers are
the real parties in interest in lawsuits against their insured tortfeasors and
authorized a right of direct action against them.23 8 The court accomplished this

outcome by construing an existing rule of civil procedure, 239 which provided
that "[a]ny person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest
adverse to the plaintiff," as authorizing such actions.
Justice Ervin, writing for the Shingleton majority, acknowledged that resolution of the question before the court entailed "the process of weighing and
measuring certain countervailing public policies."240 To Justice Ervin, public
policy was "a molding device available to the judicial process by which changing realities and the attending manifested rules of fair play may be incorporated into our corpus juris," 241 and he cited Justice Cardozo's opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.2 42 as "illustrative of the role of public policy

as a catalyst toward the advancement of jurisprudence."' 24- He did not mention
that that opinion was illustrative of judicial influence over public policy
through case law and the force of precedent, not as an exercise of the rulemaking power.
The late Justice Drew, dissenting, 2 44 was apparently quite exercised at the
court's action. He wrote:
232. State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1969).
233. In re Clarification, supranote 5.
234. Markert v. Johnson, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978); Carter v. Sparkman, 35 So. 2d 802
(Fla. 1976).
235. State Dep't of Health &Rehabilitative Servs. v. Golden, 250 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1976).
236. Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974).
237. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
238. Id. at 719-20.
289. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.210.
240. 228 So. 2d at 716.
241. Id. at715.
242. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
243. 228 So. 2d at 715.
244. Id. at 720.
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The cases are legion in which this Court has reversed trial courts for

even permitting the suggestion in the presence of the jury that the defendant was insured. Such opinions are, in my judgment, wholly irreconcilable with the idea that we now have the power, by the simple process

of adopting a rule of procedure, to permit such an insurer to be made a
party to such litigation. This is substantive law -something that only
the Legislature may regulate. We are, indeed, treading on sacred ground.
Whatever may be my views on what is best or what the rule or law should
be - I do not think we have the right
or the power to do that which has
245

been done in the majority opinion.

Justice B.K. Roberts concurred in the views expressed by Justice Drew.
The value of Shingleton v. Bussey for the present discussion is not diminished by the circumstance that it introduced a period of confusion in Florida
2 47
case law24 6 or that it required subsequent clarification by the supreme court.
This case remains an excellent example of the court's boldly seizing the initiative in the making of public policy through the exercise of its rulemaking
power.
In the 1977 case of Avila South Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corpo8
ration,24
the supreme court invalidated as "an impermissible incursion...
into the exclusive prerogative of this Court to adopt rules 'for practice and
procedure in all courts,' ",249 a statute that purported to authorize the board of
administration of a condominium association not controlled by the developer
to maintain a class action "on behalf of unit owners of a condominium with
250
reference to matters of common interest."
Notwithstanding its holding of invalidity, the court acknowledged the existence of policy elements in the statute. Observing that "the peculiar features
of condominium development, ownership, and operation indicate the wisdom
of providing a procedural vehicle for settlement of disputes affecting condominium unit owners concerning matters of common interest,"25-1 the court
proceeded to adopt the substance of the invalidated statute as Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.220.252
In a subsequent proceeding instituted by a bar committee to challenge the
necessity and appropriateness of this rule, 255 the court further acknowledged
the policy basis for the rule:
[P]ublic policy is advanced by expressly declaring condominium association members a class as a matter of law without the necessity for pleading or proving the traditional seven class action elements enunciated in
Frankel and Harrell,supra. Respondent's position essentially is that the
245. Id. at 722.
246. Kratz v. Newsom, 251 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 2d D.CA. 1971).
247. Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
248. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
249. Id. at 608.
250. FLA. STAT. §711.12(2) (1975).

251. 347 So. 2d at 608.
252. Id.

253. The Florida Bar: In re Rule 1.220(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 353 So. 2d
95 (Fb. 1977).
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elements traditionally required to establish the efficacy of a class are inherent in a condominium association relationship making pleading and
proof of such elements unnecessary and burdensome. This position is
reinforced by the argument that individual association members are protected from capricious or arbitrary class actions by the governing authority of the association through provisions of Chapter 718 ....
We concur with the respondent. 254
However, the clearest statement of the court's aggressive attitude toward its
expanded policymaking role was probably that contained in a footnote to an
opinion written by Chief Justice England in the 1978 case of Markert v.
Johnson.255 The court there held invalid as an encroachment on its own exclusive rulemaking authority a statute that purported to regulate the stage of a
proceeding at which auto liability insurers could be joined as codefendants.56
The Chief Justice addressed the following comment to those who had argued
that the court was overstepping its proper bounds:
A recurring argument advanced by proponents of the statute is that
the issue of joinder of insurers is simply a matter of public policy, the
declaration of which is primarily a legislative function. It is asserted that
only in the absence of a constitutional or statutory declaration may public policy be determined by the courts. The fallacy in that reasoning, of
course, is that, as a matter of constitutional imperative, only the Supreme
Court has the power to adopt rules of practice and procedure for Florida
courts. The fact that our rules may reflect the prevailing public policy whether by design or by coincidence -obviously does not enable the
legislature to encroach on our rulemaking authority. The separation of
powers doctrine precludes that result. Art. II, s. 3, Fla. Const.257

The Chief Justice's analysis is accurate in only a technical and rather irrelevant
sense. True, only the court is capable of promulgating court rules per se. However, it is quite possible for court procedures to be regulated by statute, and
there is certainly no such "constitutional imperative" as the Chief Justice poses
requiring that the court's rulemaking authority operate to the total exclusion
of legislative authority.2 58 If there is such an imperative, the constitution should
be amended to delete it.
Justice Alderman, concurring specially, also provided an excellent illustration of the Florida court's apparent inability to discern the incongruity of its
involvement, through its rulemaking authority, in matters of important public
policy. He agreed with the majority that "the legislature has impermissibly
encroached on the judiciary's procedural rulemaking prerogative." 259 Yet, he
recognized that the legislature had expressed the strong public policy that
"[w]hether or not a defendant has liability insurance coverage should in no

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 97.
367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).
FLA. STAT. §627.7262 (1977).
367 So. 2d at 1005 n.8.
See text accompanying notes 111-167 supra.
367 So. 2d at 1006.
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way affect the outcome of a lawsuit." 260 He urged the court to adopt the substance of section 627.7262 as a rule of procedure.26 1
In the final analysis, it is not particularly important whether the court is
fully aware of its expanded policy role or whether it announces from time to
time that it is determining important issues of public policy. The important
thing is for such issues to be determined according to the principles that are
proclaimed as the basis of Florida's government structure. 262
RuLs OvR STATUTEs IN EVENT OF CoNFLitr?

Abandonment of the doctrine that the Florida supreme court's constitu-

tional rulemaking authority is exclusive would only partially restore legislative
authority to is proper role as the state's primary policy-making organ. Full
restoration of that role also requires abandonment of the principle that rules of
practice and procedure prevail over conflicting statutes. After all, legislative
discretion is ousted by pre-existing or superseding rules with which it happens
to conflict nearly as efficiently as if by an exclusive rulemaking authority.
Since the current status of this priority of rules over statutes is somewhat
uncertain, a brief explanation is in order. It will be recalled that in 1955, prior
to adoption of the original constitutional grant of rulemaking authority to the
court, the legislature provided by statute that rules of practice and procedure
were to prevail over any conflicting statutes.2 63 This statute, which is still on the
books, 264 was rendered superfluous by the 1956 revision of article V, since the
wording of its grant of rulemaking authority to the court 26 5 necessarily implied
a constitutional priority for rules of the court.
266 Id.
261. Id. The court had missed, perhaps "avoided," an earlier opportunity to decide
whether the question of joinder was substantive and therefore appropriate to legislative
regulation. In Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), the court construed the provision of FLA. STAT. §768.134(l) (1975) reading: "Furthermore, in any civil medical malpractice
action, the trial on the merits shall be conducted without any reference to insurance, insurance coverage, or joinder of the insurer as a codefendant in the suit." The court held that
the legislature intended to bar only "any reference" to the joinder of insurers rather than the
joinder itself. Then the court proceeded to hold the entire sentence invalid as a legislative
encroachment on the court's rulemaking authority and promulgated FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(e)
purporting to incorporate the court's construction of the substance of the invalidated sentence.
It seems strange, however, that the legislature would have barred "mention" of joinder in
addition to mention of insurance and insurance coverage. It is more likely that it intended to
prohibit joinder itself and that the provision should have been worded and punctuated as
follows: "... the trial on the merits shall be conducted without any reference to insurance or
insurance coverage and without joinder of the insurer as a codefendant in the suit." If this
surmise is correct, one may conclude that faulty drafting and unimaginative judicial construction are equally to blame for the frustration of an important legislative policy.
262. In assessing the social or political cost of such exclusions of legislative authority as
have been described in this section, one must avoid being influenced, even subconsciously, by
any perceived lack of merit in the statutory policies that were the object of judicial review. It
is not a question of the wisdom of the particular enactment, but whether the policy involved
should be regulated by legislative or judicial authority.
263. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
264. FPA. STAT. §25.371 (1979).
265. FA. CONsT. art. V, §3 (1885): "The practice and procedure in all courts shall be
governed by rules adopted by the supreme court,"
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The adoption of the 1973 revision of article V and the court's almost im26
mediate holding that its rulemaking authority thereunder was exclusive 6
relegated the statutory priority to the status of something like a "lesser-included
principle." Obviously, if the legislature were totally excluded from enacting
statutes relating to practice and procedure, there could never be a conflict to
which the priority could be applied. It is true that the court on occasion continued to announce that a particular statute had been superseded by a rule of
procedure. 26 However, it never reconciled such statements with its prevailing
position that its rulemaking authority was exclusive.
Of course, the present wording of article V does not expressly require that
rules of practice and procedure be accorded a priority over conflicting statutes.
However, suppose the court had not taken the position that its rulemaking
authority was exclusive. In such event, would the revised wording of the grant
of rulemaking authority have implied a priority for rules? Although the case
for such an implied priority for rules over conflicting statutes is certainly
stronger than any which could be made for the exclusiveness of the rulemaking
authority, there would seem to be sufficient basis for the court to hold to the
contrary if it chose to do so on grounds of policy. It is certainly doubtful that
the framers could have intended such a priority had they been aware of the
substantial impairment of legislative authority that it would entail. In any
event, the priority for rules contained in section 25.371 of the Florida Statutes268 should be repealed.
CONCLUSION

269

By an unwarranted holding in an unprecedented proceeding2 7° that its
constitutional rulemaking authority was exclusive, the Florida supreme court
created a vast potential for confusion 271 and effectively foreclosed the Florida
Legislature from its rightful role in determining questions of policy that are
involved in court procedures.27 2 By adopting an extremely broad and allinclusive definition of the area of practice and procedure thus brought within
its exclusive authority,27 3 the court assured that the resulting confusion and

exclusion of legislative authority would be maximized.
The principal elements of the required solution have already been identified. The existing confusion over the legitimacy of various statutory provisions,
including portions of the new Evidence Code, would be greatly reduced if the
legislature and the supreme court possessed concurrent authority to initiate the
regulation of court procedure. Any uncertainty remaining would be more easily
dealt with because it would be focused on specific rules and statutes that were in
conflict. However, to fully restore the Legislature to its proper role, it must not
266.

In re Clarification, supranote 5.

267. Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974).
268. FLA. STAT. §25.371 (1979).
269.
270.

See text accompanying notes 111-167 supra.
See text accompanying note 68 supra.

271.

See text accompanying note 168 supra.

272. See text accompanying note 227 supra.

273. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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only possess full authority to enact legislation concerning court procedures, but
its statutes also must prevail over rules of court to the extent of any conflict.
Some may think the proposed solution would jeopardize the independence
of the courts by opening the way to legislative tampering with court procedures. There is no denying this possibility. The question arises, therefore, in
what manner and to what extent can such secondary values as the preservation
of judicial independence, full utilization of the advantages of court initiation of
rules of procedure, and the like, be safeguarded if the proposed solution is
adopted?
Levin and Amsterdam agreed on the need for "a system of concurrent jurisdiction which would assure ultimate legislative power on those matters of
policy which should be decided by a body 'subject to the popular will,' while
retaining judicial initiative and primary responsibility in the vast range of
technical material which is the bulk of the adjective law." 274 They proposed to
accomplish this laudable objective by imposing two requirements on legislative
participation in the regulation of court procedures. First, "an enactment which
would effect the repeal or amendment of any existing rule of court or which
would establish a new procedural regulation, whether or not inconsistent with
existing rules, should be required to receive some portion more than a simple
majority vote in the legislature."2 75 The result of this requirement, they
thought, would be "to discourage rash and too-facile intervention in the business of the courts."276 Second, they proposed that "provision should be made
for the automatic termination of effect of all such enactments, so that the areas
frozen down by legislative intervention may again become, within a reasonable
time, accessible to alteration by the courts." 277 Six years was suggested as the
period of effectiveness.
But these requirements are subject to the same infirmity as the existing arrangement in Florida, because they attempt to use the distinction between
substance and procedure as the boundary of a power to initiate procedural
regulations. Whether this boundary is understood to coincide with the broad,
generalized area presently encompassed by the Florida court's rulemaking
authority or with some alternative formulation, the difficulty remains of determining, during the legislative process, just which legislative enactments are
subject to the requirements. Moreover, the proposed requirements are also objectionable as being inconsistent with the basic rationale for providing a
legislative role in the regulation of court procedures in the first place. The
necessity for such participation arises from the established fact that elements
of public policy which are appropriate to legislative regulation are inevitably
intertwined with court procedures. The practical effect of the requirement of
an extraordinary majority vote would be to accord an unwarranted advantage
to the voting minority on any such issue of policy before the legislature. Similarly, limiting the period of effectiveness of any legislation dealing with court
274. Levin &Amsterdam, supra note 12, at 14.

275. Id. at 39.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 40. Six years was suggested as the period of effectiveness.
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procedures would also operate to strengthen the minority's position, by effectively reopening the policy issue at the end of each period of effectiveness.
The only viable alternative is to rely on the legislature to exercise self restraint and refrain from such tampering. But the self-restraint referred to is not
motivated solely by altruistic impulses. There are a number of reasons why a
sophisticated observer would be reasonably confident that the court's rules
would generally be free from such legislative tampering. He would be aware,
for example, that it is simply not the style of the present-day Florida legislature to concern itself greatly with the control of court procedures. True, one
might wonder, at the close of a long period of legislative dominance of this
subject matter, whether the legislature was capable of a sudden transition to
self restraint. However, we are not in such a situation at this time.278 The
Florida supreme court has possessed constitutional authority over practice and
procedure for more than twenty years and has exercised that authority boldly.
During this period, the legislature has not been greatly concerned with practice
and procedure in the courts.
Such an observer would also be aware that the Florida Legislature is subject
to strong control by the legislative leadership. Through their power to appoint
standing committees and designate chairmen - as well as to remove committee
members and chairmen - the presiding officers of both houses of the Florida
Legislature maintain a very tight rein on the work of their respective houses. It
is unlikely that the leadership would permit systematic encroachment on the
court's initiative through the enactment of the pet notions of individual members. Finally, there is the undoubted extent to which the parliamentary procedures of a bicameral legislature favor those who oppose legislative action.
This essentially negative factor would also operate strongly to protect court
rules against legislative tampering.
Finally, if concern over the possibility of legislative tampering is not completely assuaged by such considerations, additional assurance may be derived
from the realization that the court could probably continue to protect its procedures against legislative encroachment to the extent supported by a limited
claim of inherent rulemaking authority. The Florida court has never been
particularly aggressive in claiming such authority, possibly because it has for so
long been the recipient of generous delegations of rulemaking authority, either
by statute or the constitution. However, the court has never completely renounced it. Indeed, in the very opinion by which it disclaimed possessing the
measure of inherent authority that would enable it to adopt a wholesale revision
of the rules of civil procedure in the face of existing statutory regulations, the

278. Also, recall that the Florida legislature actually did delegate dominant rulemaking
authority to the Florida supreme court at the close of just such a period. See text accompanying note 33 supra. See Ehrhardt, A Look at Florida's Proposed Code of Evidence, 4 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 681, 714 (1974): "If frequent legislative tampering with the Code is feared, it should
be remembered that several statutes dealing with isolated evidentiary matters have existed in
Florida for a number of years and the legislature has not amended them often. Moreover,
the problem has not arisen in California, New Jersey and Kansas - the three states with the
most experience with evidence codification,"
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not be respected by
court also asserted that statutes regulating procedure would
279
justice."
of
administration
the
hamper
the court "if they
To the extent, therefore, that a rule of the court related solely to the orderly
dispatch of judicial business and did not infringe upon, change, or affect any
substantive right, it would probably be held to prevail over a conflicting statute.
There would seem to be no more than a theoretical threat to legitimate legislative authority in such a minimal priority.
279. In re Promulgation, supra note 20. See Bryan v. State, 94 Fla. 909, 910, 114 So. 773,
774 (1927): "Should the Legislature seek to interfere with the inherent power of the court to
regulate the conduct of its own business and by statutory enactment undertake to prescribe
rules conceived by it to be better adapted for the orderly, efficient, economical administration
of justice, the effort would be a vain attempt to encroach upon the powers, duties, and functions of a co-ordinate and coeval branch of the government; for the power to make its own
rules for the conduct of its business is inherent in the court. It exists independent of statute.
It is not absolute but subject to limitations based on reasonableness and conformity to constitutional and statutory provisions of general law." See Sydney v. Auburndale Constr. Corp.,
96 Fla. 688, 689, 119 So. 128, 129 (1928): "The Legislature has no power to prescribe rules
regulating the conduct of the court's business or other matters within the inherent power of
the court to regulate."
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